

## **Making Sense of the Vote: The 2000 Canadian Election**

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The 2000 federal election confirmed the dominance of the Liberal Party in Canadian politics. The party won its third successive majority election and saw its vote share increase from 38.5 percent in the 1997 election to 40.8 percent. Not surprisingly, the election was widely construed as a major victory for the Liberals and, above all, for Prime Minister Chrétien. However, the Liberals actually lost two points in the West and their support slipped during the campaign, leaving their final tally of 40.8 percent of the vote well below the 50 percent or so support they had enjoyed until early 2000.

Meanwhile, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to believe that the Alliance was the great loser in the election and that its leader, Stockwell Day, was squarely to blame. However, the Alliance did manage to register advances over the 1997 Reform results in every province but one. And it was the Alliance that registered the largest net gain of any of the parties, winning 25.5 percent of the vote, compared with only 19.4 percent for Reform in 1997. The Reform Party had re-constituted itself as the Alliance in March 2000, but the new party had remained tied with the Conservatives at around 15 percent. It was only after Day's election as leader that the Alliance was able to re-establish itself as the second strongest party. The real failure in the 2000 election, of course, was that the Alliance did not get the 30 percent of the vote, or the 10 seats, that it needed in Ontario.

The Conservatives and the NDP both gained ground during the campaign and it was only thanks to those gains that they were able to maintain their status as official parties in the House of Commons. Still, the Conservatives saw their vote share slip from 18.8 percent in 1997 to 12.2 percent and they lost some ground in every province. In Quebec, they lost a disastrous 16 percentage points, finishing fourth behind the Alliance. With only 5.6 percent of the Quebec vote, the party's vote share in 2000 was barely one fourth of what it had been in 1997 in that province. Outside Quebec, the party lost three points. The outcome must also have been disappointing for the NDP: its vote share fell from 11.0 percent in 1997 to under 8.5 percent, only slightly better than its disastrous 1993 election result. The party lost almost four points outside Quebec, a relative decline of 25 percent, with the sharpest drops occurring in Atlantic Canada and British Columbia. Its support was concentrated in Nova Scotia, leader Alexa McDonough's home province.

Finally, the Bloc saw its share of the vote in Quebec increase slightly, edging up from 37.9 percent in 1997 to 39.9 percent, but for the first time in its history, the Bloc lost out to the Liberals and failed to win a plurality in Quebec.

In this paper, we set out to do two things: to provide an explanation of individual vote choice and to offer an account of the overall outcome of the election. In other words, we want to look at the election from both the bottom up and the top down. Both perspectives are needed to make sense of the election. It is quite possible for a factor to have a substantial effect on how people vote but to have no net impact on the outcome of the election. Take tax cuts, for example. In order to assess whether the issue helped the Alliance, we need to ascertain whether voters' opinions on tax cuts had any independent effect on their vote choice. But the issue could have a significant effect on individual voting decisions and yet have no net overall effect on the Alliance vote share if as many voters were attracted to the Alliance as were repelled because of this issue. Accordingly, we develop a methodology that allows us to ascertain both the **gross** individual-level effect of a given explanatory factor on voters and its **net** overall effect on the parties.

Our explanatory framework is multi-stage (see Figure 1). The basic idea is that some of the factors that affect vote choice, such as how we feel about party leaders, are closer in time to the vote decision while others, such as our ideological orientations, are more distant from actual vote choice. These longer-term predispositions can affect the vote directly but they can also affect the vote indirectly by influencing more proximate factors like leader evaluations and issue positions.

**Figure 1: The Multi-Stage Explanatory Framework**




Figure 1 illustrates the framework. It is inspired by the ‘bloc recursive’ approach developed by Miller and Shanks (1996). It incorporates six blocs of variables. These blocs are similar to the ones we utilized in our analysis of the 1997 Canadian election (Nevitte et al. 2000) and also to those retained by Miller and Shanks.<sup>1</sup> Each bloc corresponds to a set of considerations that affect vote choice.

At the farthest remove are a variety of social background characteristics that can shape voters’ fundamental beliefs and political values and influence their party loyalties. Conventional wisdom has tended to be that Canadians’ vote choices are only weakly rooted in the social structure, that relatively few Canadians have any sort of durable psychological attachment to a political party, and that relatively few Canadians have coherent ideological beliefs. Accordingly, attention has focused on the short-term factors that are specific to the given election.

The first of these proximate influences is the economy. How voters feel about the economy can affect their evaluations of both the parties and their leaders. A voter who was generally inclined to vote Liberal, for example, might have been tempted to vote for another party if the economy was perceived to be doing poorly. Economic perceptions could also affect where voters stood on the fiscal issues that were so prominent in the 2000 election (Clarke and Kornberg 1992).

Like economic voting, issue voting potentially has both a **prospective** dimension and a **retrospective** dimension. Voters can look at the parties’ positions and decide to support the party that seems most likely to defend their own views. However, voters can also focus on what the incumbent government has--and has not--accomplished during its mandate and vote for or against the government on the basis of whether that performance is judged satisfactory or not

Then there are the leaders. Given the leader-centred nature of television coverage, we should expect to find that leaders figured prominently in voters’ choice of party on election day, but we also need to know **why** they mattered. In 2000, a particularly important question is whether the religious beliefs of the new Alliance leader, Stockwell Day, affected voters’ reactions to him.

The final factor to consider is qualitatively different from the previous ones. The factors discussed so far are all assumed to affect voters’ **preferences** among the parties. But in a first-past-the-post system such as Canada’s many voters may cast a **strategic** vote. In other words, they may decide to vote for their second choice rather than their most preferred party because they feel that the latter has no chance of winning. If strategic voting is occurring, it is the least competitive parties that are likely to be hurt.

We are not claiming that all voters go through each of these stages in exactly the same order. Nor are we claiming that all voters engage in such lengthy reasoning chains. Indeed, some voters may rely on simple socio-demographic cues when it comes to figuring out how to vote, such as the degree of social similarity between themselves and the party leaders (Cutler, forthcoming). Nonetheless, this explanatory schema does capture a sequence in which many voters participate, if only incompletely, and it represents a useful simplification of a complex and heterogeneous decision process. It also has the advantage of forcing us to think in terms of causal processes and to pay careful attention to the temporal sequence of these processes. The bloc recursive approach explicitly retains all exogenous factors as explanatory variables at each stage of the analysis and this makes it possible to sort out spurious relationships. The multi-stage

approach is particularly appropriate if we believe that there are significant projection effects (Miller and Shanks 1996, 209). Projection occurs when proximate variables like leader evaluations are strongly affected by predispositions like partisan loyalties

Our data are taken from the 2000 Canadian Election Study. The study consists of a three-wave survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. The study includes a rolling cross-section survey with a representative sample of 3,651 Canadians (the response rate was 60 percent), a post-election survey with 2,862 of the campaign survey respondents, and a mail back questionnaire filled out by 1,535 of the post-election respondents.<sup>2</sup>

The dependent variable is vote choice. Fortunately, there is a good fit between reported vote in the post-election survey and the actual outcome of the election, both for the country as a whole and for the various regions (Blais et al. 2001a). There is only one instance where the deviation is greater than three percentage points, and that is the under-estimation of the Liberal vote in Quebec. This bias is typical of all surveys conducted in Quebec, with support for federalist parties being systematically under-estimated.<sup>3</sup>

We analyze vote choice separately inside and outside Quebec. The presence of the Bloc Québécois means that Quebec voters were not offered the same choice as voters in other provinces. Our analysis is confined to those who voted Liberal, Alliance, Conservative, or NDP outside Quebec and those who voted Liberal, Bloc Québécois, Alliance, or Conservative in Quebec. There are not enough voters who supported smaller parties to be able to offer reliable generalizations about them.<sup>4</sup>

Our estimations are based on multinomial logit. The results of these estimations are reported in Appendices A and B. These estimations allow us to look at each pair of parties and to determine whether supporters of the two parties are statistically distinct from each other, controlling for other factors. The meaning of the logit coefficients depends on the values of the other variables in the model and so the coefficients themselves cannot be easily interpreted. However, they enable us to compute the independent impact of a variable on the propensity to vote for each party. These estimated impacts are presented in Appendices C and D. Variables were only retained in the model if their effects were statistically significant at the .05 level or higher when they were first entered in the equations.<sup>5</sup>

We also report simulations indicating how many fewer votes or how many more votes the various parties would have received if a given factor had had no impact on vote choice. These simulations enable us to assess the overall impact that each factor had on a party's electoral fortunes. The results of these simulations are presented whenever appropriate in the text.

## **Findings**

### **Social Background Characteristics**

In Canada, the conventional wisdom has been that vote choice is only weakly related to social background characteristics (Clarke et al. 1979; Leduc 1984). While this certainly remains true of social class (Gidengil 2002), the role of other factors like region and gender has been increasing in importance.

The depth of the regional divide is readily appreciated. The Liberals obtained 52 percent of the vote in Ontario but only 25 percent in the West. Meanwhile, the Alliance received 50 percent in the West but a mere 10 percent in Atlantic Canada. Conversely,

the Conservatives won 31 percent of the vote in the Atlantic provinces but only 10 percent in the West. Finally, the NDP won twice as many votes (17 percent) in Atlantic Canada as they did in Ontario (8 percent). These regional differences are not simply a matter of differences in the socio-demographic make-up of the regions (Gidengil et al. 1999). The Liberals, for example, are strongest in Ontario but this is not the region with the highest concentration of voters like Catholics or Canadians of non-European origin who are predisposed to vote Liberal.<sup>6</sup> Even controlling for a host of other social background characteristics, the effects of region remain substantial (see Appendix C).

A significant gender gap has also emerged in Canada over the years (Erickson and O'Neill, forthcoming; Gidengil et al., forthcoming). The most striking aspect of this gap in the 2000 election was the greater propensity of men to vote for the Alliance (see Appendix A). Outside Quebec, the Alliance received 39 percent of the vote among men, but only 28 percent among women. The equivalent figures for the NDP were 9 percent and 16 percent. These differences are unaffected by region, religion, or ethnicity. Indeed, the estimated impact of sex on vote choice when other social background characteristics are taken into account is 12 points for the Alliance and just over 6 points for the NDP. The Alliance's inability to obtain the support of more women is one crucial reason for its lack of success in Ontario. Thirty percent of men in that province voted Alliance. If the party had been able to do as well among Ontario women, it would have managed to make the breakthrough it was aiming for at the beginning of the campaign.

Religion has been one of the most enduring sources of cleavage in federal elections (Irvine 1974; Johnston 1985; Mendelsohn and Nadeau 1997). Since the very earliest studies of voting behaviour in Canada, Catholic voters have been significantly more likely to vote for the Liberal Party. Meanwhile, voters with no religious affiliation have traditionally been more likely than other voters to opt for the NDP. In 2000, the probability of voting Liberal was 14 percentage points higher among Catholics outside Quebec, while the probability of voting NDP was 16 points higher among those with no religion, even taking into account other salient social background characteristics like region and ethnicity. Protestants, for their part, were more likely to support the Alliance. Our simulations indicate that the Liberal vote share would have dropped by four points and the Alliance share would have increased by three points if Catholics (who made up 29 percent of our sample outside Quebec) had voted like Canadians of other religious denominations.<sup>7</sup>

The support of Canadians of non-European origin was also a crucial component of Liberal success. According to our simulations, if voters of non-European origin had voted like those of other origins, the Liberal vote would have been three percentage points lower and the Alliance vote two points higher. The propensity to vote Liberal was a hefty 31 points higher among voters of non-European origin, while the propensity to vote Alliance was 11 points higher among those of Northern European (excluding Britain and Ireland) origin. Likewise those whose first language is neither French nor English were more inclined (13 points) to vote Liberal. The probability of a Liberal vote was 44 points higher among voters of non-European origin whose first language is neither French nor English.

Rural voters, on the other hand, were significantly more likely to vote Alliance. Indeed, rural areas proved to be the party's strongest supporters. Forty-six percent of rural voters voted for the Alliance, while only 31 percent opted for the Liberals. In

Ontario, the party did as well (42 percent) as the Liberals (39 percent) in rural settings. The problem for the Alliance is that rural voters account for only a relatively small proportion of the total electorate (21 percent of our sample) and there are very few constituencies that are controlled by rural voters. And the rural/urban cleavage failed to emerge in Atlantic Canada, Canada's most rural region. Still, the rural vote was clearly very important for the Alliance. If rural voters had voted like their urban counterparts, the Alliance would have trailed the Liberals by 12 points outside Quebec instead of 7. But the larger point remains that the party received little support from urban voters outside the West and this was a significant factor in its inability to win a larger share of the vote. The Liberals, on the other hand, did better among urban voters than among rural voters.

The only other social background characteristic that had a significant impact on vote choice outside Quebec was marital status. The Alliance did significantly better among voters who are married, whereas the NDP fared better among those who are not. However, the impact of marital status was not of much consequence for the parties' vote shares.

Finally, it is important to highlight some social background characteristics that did **not** have a significant effect on vote choice. Union membership used to be associated (albeit not very strongly) with support for the NDP (Archer 1985), but this is no longer the case. Outside Quebec, only 14 percent of union members voted NDP in 2000, compared with 11 percent of non-union members, and union members were much more likely to vote Alliance (30 percent) than they were to vote NDP. Income also failed to have any significant independent impact on vote choice, confirming the lack of class-based voting in Canada. Indeed, the only socio-economic characteristic that affected vote choice was education: the NDP did slightly better, and the Conservatives did slightly worse, among less educated voters. Education was one of the few social background characteristics that a significant independent effect on the propensity to vote Conservative. Finally, there was no sign of an association between age and vote choice outside Quebec.

Social background characteristics play out quite differently in Quebec (see Appendices B and D). First, age clearly mattered: the propensity to vote for the Bloc was 11 points lower among those aged 55 and over. This is consistent with the familiar finding that older voters in Quebec are significantly more likely to be federalists. But the effect of age pales beside that of language. The impact of language is huge: the probability of a Liberal vote is 42 points higher among non-francophones. Language and age are the only two socio-demographic variables that really count in Quebec.<sup>8</sup>

In Quebec, then, the situation is relatively simple. There are three major groups: non-francophones, francophones under the age of 55 and francophones 55 years and older. Seventy-seven percent of non-francophones voted Liberal, 55 percent of francophones under the age of 55 voted for the Bloc, and the two parties were more or less tied (with a slight Liberal edge) among francophones aged 55 and over.

Models of vote choice in Canada have traditionally downplayed the importance of social background characteristics. One reason has been a perception that characteristics that change slowly, if at all, across time cannot account for electoral change (Kanji and Archer 2002). However, even within the short time frame of an election campaign the social bases of party support can shift in consequential ways. When we compared the vote intentions of the various social groups before and after the leaders' debates, there

was evidence of a substantial shift among voters whose first language was neither French nor English. Outside Quebec, the Alliance managed to obtain 34 percent of the vote among those interviewed during the first half of the campaign, but the percentage fell to 21 percent in the second half. This raises the possibility that allegations of racism within the Alliance made members of minority ethnic groups more reluctant to support the party. It also drives home the point that social groups need to be treated as live social forces, not static categories.

### **Values and Beliefs**

When Prime Minister Chrétien called the election on October 22, he immediately launched into a forceful appeal to voters to think about their values and beliefs. The election call was framed as an opportunity for Canadians to choose between different visions and different values: “This election” Chrétien declared, “offers two very different visions of Canada, two crystal clear alternatives. The nature of that choice is clear and the right time to choose is now” (CBC, *The National*, October 22). And if there was ever any ambiguity about which parties spoke for each of the “two visions”, clarity on the matter was supplied by the Liberal Minister of Finance at the end of the first week of the campaign. “Never has there been an election in the history of this country” claimed Paul Martin, “where the line in the sand has been drawn as clearly as it has been between the Liberal vision and the Alliance vision” (CBC, *The National*, October 29). The Liberals portrayed the Alliance as a party appealing to “narrow interests” and as a party that would “Americanize Canada” (*Globe and Mail*, October 28, A8). Meanwhile, the Liberals presented themselves as the champions of “the values that made Canada what it is today” (*Globe and Mail*, October 26, A10) and they argued that it was important to “keep working on that because we never know when there will not be a force who will come and appeal to the dark side that exists in human beings” (*Globe and Mail*, October 31, A4). A more direct appeal to citizens’ to look to their values when making their vote decision would be hard to imagine. The question is: did Canadians respond?

Which values are likely to have mattered most? Religiosity and social conservatism are two obvious candidates. Stockwell Day’s religious fundamentalism drew attention to religious convictions in a way that is highly unusual in contemporary Canadian election campaigns. The Alliance portrayed Days’ religious beliefs as an asset. The party’s campaign co-director Jason Kenney argued that because of these “strong personal convictions”, people will know that “Stockwell Day is somebody that will stick to his commitments” (*Globe and Mail*, October 23, A8). The implication was that the Alliance leader would be more likely to “keep promises”. This was a pointed reference to what Reform in the previous election campaign had called the Liberal record of “broken promises”.

The Liberal counter attack was swift and vigorous, and it touched on several themes at the same time. One was that Canadians who were not fundamentalists of the Stockwell Day variety might have something to worry about. “It’s not for me,” Chrétien re-assured Canadians, “to impose my morality on others in a diverse society with many religions like the one we have” (CBC, *The National*, November 10). Chrétien also seized the opportunity to muse out loud about whether the Alliance wanted religion to play a larger role in shaping public policy while expressing thinly veiled skepticism about Days’ views about “creationism”. “In my family”, Chrétien told *The National*, “separation of

Church and the separation of state is important. Church is private but now there is a debate about evolution and creation and I'm not getting involved with that" (CBC, *The National*, November 17). "I believe in the "creation" of jobs", Chrétien quipped (*Globe and Mail*, November 17, A6).

The issue of race also emerged during the campaign, albeit briefly. Alliance candidate Betty Granger's views about "the Asian invasion" were broadcast across the country by English network TV in the third week of the campaign. This controversy handed the Liberals an opportunity to take the high ground and to cast the Alliance as a haven for the intolerant. "That kind of anti-immigrant, racist, bigoted opinion", Liberal immigration minister Elinor Caplan charged, "is not something the Liberal Party would tolerate and it says a lot about Stockwell Day and his supporters" (CBC, *The National*, November 17). Gender issues, by contrast, received hardly any campaign attention at all although the NDP's Alexa McDonough raised concerns about them from time to time.

The economic policy issue that featured most prominently throughout the campaign concerned how much taxes should be cut and how the surplus should be used—to cut taxes, to pay down the federal debt or to increase spending on social programs. Every party expressed a position on the matter and often in ways that invoked more general beliefs about free enterprise and the role of the state. The same could be said of the disagreements about the health care system. Both the Alliance and the Liberals reminded voters about where they stood on the basic question of the role of the government in the economy. "Anytime you have a strong economy," argued Stockwell Day, "you have to look to the private sector for creating that economy" (CBC, *The National*, October 23). The Liberals responded that governments have an important role to play in managing the economy. "Eliminating the role of the national government in developing high skills jobs is the Reform-Alliance's concept of a new idea", countered Chretien. "It is not a new idea but a bad idea, and it's no way to run a country" (Jean Chretien, CBC, *The National*, October 24). Two weeks later, Finance Minister Martin acidly remarked, "the Alliance believes that the only role for government is to sit back and watch the world go around" (*Globe and Mail*, November 13, A9).

From the very first day of the campaign, every single opposition party tried to capitalize on the perception that public cynicism was high and that the Liberals had been in power too long. The Alliance opened with a sharp volley: "This is a government which is obsessed with perpetuating itself and keeping power for its own sake", pronounced Jason Kenny, the party's campaign co-chair. "We think that is a record of arrogance not moderation" (CBC, *The National*, October 22). NDP leader Alexa McDonough took the same line. "Jean Chretien" she charged, "is extremely arrogant and completely out of touch with ordinary people" (*Globe and Mail*, October 23, A 9). The Alliance leader echoed the very same sentiments in almost exactly the same words the very next day (CBC, *The National*, October 24). And Progressive Conservative leader Joe Clark chimed in with a similar attack on the Liberal government two days after that (*Globe and Mail*, October 27).

These attacks hit home. Voters who felt cynical about politics and who believed that their province was not being fairly treated by the federal government were less inclined to vote Liberal. Our estimations indicate that, other things being equal, the probability of voting Liberal outside Quebec was 18 points lower among voters who were highly cynical, compared with those who were neutral. The effect was similar in Quebec.

Though not quite as consequential, feelings of regional alienation were also important. There is one interesting difference, however. Whereas cynicism fuelled support for all of the opposition parties, regional alienation tended to produce a vote for the Alliance (outside Quebec) or the Bloc (in Quebec). The perception that one's province is treated unfairly was clearly an important consideration in voting Alliance. Meanwhile, in Quebec, a substantial minority (22 percent) of non-sovereignists think that Quebec is less well treated than other provinces: 29 percent of them voted Bloc and a non-negligible 18 percent voted Alliance. So support for the Bloc does not depend solely on support for sovereignty.

Outside Quebec, the most powerful value dimension appears to be the classic left/right cleavage about the place of free enterprise in our society. "Left" and "right" may not be part of the common Canadian vocabulary but the reality is that the traditional left/right opposition is central when it comes to making sense of the vote. Indeed, this was the most important value motivating both the Conservative and the NDP vote. The NDP does particularly well among those who are highly skeptical of the virtues of free enterprise, while support for free enterprise seems to be the only value that matters for the Conservative vote. However, people who supported free enterprise were much more likely to vote for the Alliance. It was also important for the Liberal vote. Everything else being equal, the propensity to vote Liberal was 11 points lower outside Quebec for someone who was very positive about the free enterprise system, compared with someone who was neutral or ambivalent.

Social conservatism also mattered and so did views about feminism and racial minorities. Outside Quebec, the propensity to vote Liberal decreased by 6 points for social conservatives and increased by 5 points for those sympathetic to feminism and racial minorities. The NDP vote was also partly driven by a rejection of social conservatism. The Alliance vote was even more strongly affected by people's positions on these normative dimensions. People who are socially conservative were much more likely to vote for the Alliance, while those who expressed sympathy for feminism and racial minorities were less prone to vote for the party.

Religiosity as such does not appear to be as powerful a factor as these other value dimensions, though it did have an impact on the vote, especially when it came to the choice between the NDP and the Alliance. What mattered was not religiosity but rather Christian fundamentalist beliefs. These had been made salient by the infamous *CBC* report on Stockwell Day, entitled "Fundamental Day", that focused on the Alliance leader's personal beliefs about the Bible and creationism. Based on their agreement with the statement that "the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally word for word", almost one mail back respondent in five (19 percent) could be considered a Christian fundamentalist. When we added this variable to the multinomial estimations, it was clear that Christian fundamentalism was indeed associated with support for the Alliance and that religiosity *per se* was no longer significant.<sup>9</sup> Still, the effect of fundamentalism was not huge. Everything else being equal, the propensity to vote Alliance was only 8 points higher among those who believe that the Bible should be taken literally. This is smaller than the effect of views about free enterprise or social conservatism (see Appendix C).

There is one important non-finding. Sympathy/antipathy towards Quebec was a crucial ingredient in support for the Reform Party in 1997 (Nevitte et al. 2000), but was

simply unrelated to voting for the Alliance in 2000. This is perhaps the most striking change that took place between 1997 and 2000. The debate about what should or should not be done for Quebec was no longer on the Canadian political agenda in 2000.

Needless to say, the situation was quite different in Quebec. In that province, the most powerful factor was clearly one's views about sovereignty. Everything else being equal, the propensity to vote for the Bloc québécois was 34 percentage points higher when the voter was strongly in favor of sovereignty, compared with a voter who was neutral or ambivalent. No other consideration, inside or outside Quebec, was as consequential for vote choice as this one. Because it was so dominant a consideration, there was little room left for other value cleavages. The only other relevant cleavage was social conservatism, and then only for the choice between the Bloc and the Alliance.

These values and beliefs explain part, but only part, of the observed relationships between social background characteristics and the vote. The strong support for the NDP among those with no religion flows in good part from the fact that most of them reject social conservatism. Likewise, support for the Liberals in Quebec among non-francophones and older voters is very much the result of these two groups' widespread opposition to sovereignty. And, certainly, the success of the Alliance in the West has much to do with the strong sense of regional alienation in that region. The Alliance's lack of success outside the West, though, remains unexplained. And values and beliefs do not account for the Conservative success in Atlantic Canada nor for the strong Liberal support among Catholics.

Core values and beliefs are a crucial ingredient of vote choice, but it is important not to overplay their role. According to our results, social background characteristics account for 12 percent of the variance in vote choice outside Quebec (Appendix A). Adding values and beliefs increases the explained variance to 22 percent. Values and beliefs are important to making sense of vote choice in 2000, but so are social background characteristics. In Quebec, again, the situation is different. Because of the powerful impact of attitudes about sovereignty, values clearly dominate in Quebec, increasing the explained variance from 6 percent to 40 percent.

While underlying values and beliefs are important for understanding why individual voters vote the way they do, it is not clear that they are so crucial when it comes to making sense of the **outcome** of the election. The reason is simple. An attitude will affect the outcome only if it influences vote choice **and** is skewed in one direction. Take views about free enterprise. They are relatively strongly related to vote choice, but many Canadians are ambivalent about free enterprise and the government's role in the economy and opinion among the rest is more or less evenly divided.<sup>10</sup> So what the Alliance gained among those who are favorable to free enterprise was washed out by what it lost among those who are opposed. A similar pattern applies to social conservatism. Our sample divided into three camps of roughly one third each: the social conservatives (27 percent), the social liberals (35 percent), and the ambivalent (39 percent).

Feelings about racial minorities and feminism were skewed in the positive direction and could have had a net impact on the outcome by helping the Liberals and the NDP at the expense of the Alliance. It is important, though, to take account of a possible social desirability bias in some of those positive responses.<sup>11</sup>

Fundamentalism had some impact on the outcome of the election. According to our estimates, if fundamentalism had had no effect on voters, the Alliance would have obtained 34 percent of the vote instead of 33 percent outside Quebec. So it hurt the Alliance but the impact was small.

Cynicism clearly fueled support for the opposition parties and this hurt the Liberals. The same could be said about the sense of regional alienation that prevails outside Ontario and that contributed to the success of both the Alliance and the Bloc.

Values and beliefs play a greater role in explaining the outcome of the election in Quebec. According to our survey, at the time of the election, there were 40 percent sovereignists and 57 percent federalists,<sup>12</sup> and the fact that there were more federalists than sovereignists in Quebec is the main reason why the Liberals won more votes than the Bloc. According to our estimates, if views about sovereignty had had no effect on vote choice (or if everyone in Quebec was on the neutral point on the sovereignty scale), the Liberals would have had 31 percent of the vote instead of 44 percent and the Bloc 52 percent instead of 40 percent. These Liberal gains were partly offset by losses related to cynicism and the sense of regional alienation, which both benefited the Bloc at the Liberals' expense.

### **Partisan Loyalties**

There has been a good deal of debate in Canada about the usefulness of party identification for understanding vote choice. Clarke and his colleagues (Clarke et al. 1984, 1991, 1996), in particular, have stressed the “flexibility” of partisanship in Canada and clearly there are many Canadians who approach each election with an open mind. However, it is also reasonable to assume that many Canadians think of themselves as Liberals, Alliance, Conservatives, New Democrats, or Blocist(e)s, and that these voters are inclined to vote for “their” party unless some powerful short-term forces induce them to do otherwise. The bottom line is that in Canada, as in many other countries, there **are** a significant number of partisans who are strongly predisposed to support the same party at every election and we cannot understand either vote choice or election outcomes without taking serious account of this fact.

Until 1988, the Canadian party identification question did not include an explicit option for those with no party identification. This induced some respondents to name a party even though they lacked any real sense of psychological attachment (Johnston 1992). Accordingly, the question was changed in the 1988 Canadian Election Study to read: “In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Alliance (Bloc), Conservative, NDP, or none of these?” There still remains the concern that party identification is just too close to the vote in Canada: too often when Canadians switch their votes, their party identification switches, too. It turns out that much of the problem reflects the inclusion of people who reply “not very strongly” when asked how partisan they feel. There is evidence that these weak identifiers do not really have a meaningful sense of party identification (see Blais et al. forthcoming). As a consequence, we only count those who think of themselves as very or fairly strong partisans as having a “genuine” party loyalty. These are the people who are the most strongly predisposed to support the same party at every election.

[Figure 2 about here]

When we look at the distribution of these partisans among the parties, it is clear that the Liberal Party starts any given election with a “natural” advantage over the others (see Figure 2). Fully one quarter of Canadians think of themselves as Liberals. This means that over half of those who identify with a party identify with the Liberals, giving the party a substantial edge among loyal partisans. At the time of the election, the Alliance came in second, with 11 percent of Canadians identifying with the party. This was almost double the percentage that identified with Reform in 1997 and is another reminder that the Alliance did gain ground. The Conservatives, meanwhile, saw their core of loyal partisans shrink still further, to the point where they barely outnumbered the NDP.

Liberal dominance is daunting in Ontario. Fully one third (35 percent) of Ontarians identified with the party at the time of the election. Equally telling, the Alliance share (8 percent) lagged behind the Conservatives (10 percent), despite having out-pollled the Conservatives and the NDP combined. This is further testimony to the party’s failure to break through in the province.

The Liberals also dominate in Atlantic Canada, though not as single-handedly. They benefited from a five-point drop between 1997 and 2000 in the percentage of Conservative identifiers and from the Alliance’s inability to establish any base of support in the region. As a result, there were twice as many Liberal partisans (28 percent) as Conservative ones (14 percent), giving the Liberals a substantial lead in the region with respect to core supporters.

In the West, not surprisingly, the Alliance succeeded in becoming the party with the greatest number of partisans. At the time of the election, one quarter of Westerners (24 percent) thought of themselves as Alliance supporters. More surprising is the fact that the Alliance edge over the Liberals (20 percent) was so modest. The Alliance had twice as many votes as the Liberals in the region, but their lead in terms of core supporters was a modest four points. Finally, our data confirm the difficult plight of the Conservatives in the West, with the percentage of Conservative identifiers declining from 12 percent in 1997 to 7 percent in 2000.

In Quebec, there are clearly only two parties with any significant number of core supporters, the Liberals and the Bloc. These two parties are on a more or less equal footing in terms of loyal partisans. The weakness of the Conservatives in Quebec is striking. Hardly any voters in Quebec still think of themselves as Conservatives.

[Figure 3 about here]

Party identification is strongly correlated with vote choice (Figure 3). Indeed, in the case of the Alliance, the tendency of partisans to vote for “their” party is so strong that we might wonder whether these supporters had really developed an attachment that was independent of their current decision to vote for the party. The most interesting story here concerns the behavior of Conservative identifiers. As many as two Conservative partisans out of five voted for another party, and that party was typically the Alliance. Indeed, in the West, the Alliance had as many votes as the Conservatives among Conservative partisans. Tellingly, though, these defectors did still think of themselves as Conservatives.

Our multinomial logit estimations indicate that the probability of voting for a party is typically 40 points higher when voters identify with the party, even after controlling for social background characteristics and ideological orientations (see appendices).<sup>13</sup> Party identification also had a substantial impact on the **outcome** of the election. On the basis of the regressions estimates presented in Appendices A and B, we simulated how many more--or fewer--votes each party would have obtained if party identification had had no effect on vote choice.<sup>14</sup> These simulations indicate that the Liberal vote share outside Quebec would have dropped from 40 percent to 37 percent, while the Alliance share would have increased from 33 percent to 36 percent. This implies that almost all of the seven-point Liberal lead over the Alliance is attributable to Liberal dominance among partisans. Meanwhile, the Conservatives would have won 16 percent instead of 15 percent, and the NDP would have dropped from 11 percent to nine percent. That two-point difference may seem trivial, but it suggests that the NDP was saved from losing its official party status in Parliament by its small core of loyal supporters.

The impact of party identification was particularly important in Ontario. If party identification had not mattered, the 28-point gap between the Liberals and the Alliance would have been reduced to 16 points. In the West, the Conservatives would have obtained 14 percent of the vote instead of 10 percent, while the Alliance and NDP vote shares would have fallen by one point and two points, respectively. In Atlantic Canada, on the other hand, the Alliance would have increased its share of the vote from 10 percent to 13 percent, whereas the NDP would have dropped from 17 percent to 15 percent. Finally, in Quebec, the Bloc vote would have fallen by three points, which would have given the Liberals a much larger lead over the Bloc.

These regional variations point to two important conclusions. First, partisan loyalties benefit the dominant party in a given region and, second, much of the regionalization of the vote flows from long-term differences in partisan climate (see Gidengil et al. 1999). When values and beliefs (especially the latter) are added to the estimations, the 21 point gap in Liberal vote between Ontario and the West is reduced to 13 points (see appendix C). When party identification is added as well, the gap is cut in half, narrowing to only six points. Clearly, the regional divides in vote choice owe much to longstanding differences in political culture and partisan loyalties. There is one noteworthy exception to this pattern: neither the Conservatives' success in Atlantic Canada nor the Alliance's poor showing in the region can be attributed to partisan traditions (or to political culture).

It should also be noted that a substantial fraction of the impact on vote choice of both social background characteristics and core beliefs and values is mediated by party loyalties (see appendices C and D). Party identification, for example, explains much of the Liberal support found among Catholics and voters of non-European origin. Similarly, views about free enterprise influence vote choice indirectly via their effect on party identification.

Party identification appears to play a weaker mediating role in Quebec. Opinion about sovereignty remains powerfully linked to vote choice, even after controlling for party identification. This reflects the fact that even among those with no party identification the link between opinion about sovereignty and vote choice is strong. As a

consequence, partisan loyalties as such make a smaller contribution to explaining vote choice in Quebec.

Indeed, it is important not to overplay the effect of party identification on vote choice. Once social background characteristics and basic values and beliefs are taken into account, partisan loyalties explain only 15 percent of the variance in vote choice in Quebec and 24 percent outside Quebec. The link with vote choice is not automatic for partisans. Moreover, close to half the voters do not have any meaningful sense of identification with a party. For many of these voters, the campaign is decisive. Just how decisive becomes clear when we compare their vote intentions before and after the televised leaders' debates. Before the debates, only 8 percent of non-identifiers outside Quebec indicated that they intended to vote Conservative. That percentage increased to 14 percent after the debates. Those Conservative gains came largely at the expense of the Liberals who saw their vote share among non-partisans decline from 46 percent to 39 percent.

### **The Economy**

There is a large empirical literature suggesting that the fate of incumbent governments hinges to a significant extent on economic conditions at the time the election is held. When the economy is in good shape, the party in power is likely to be re-elected. Conversely, an economic downturn can undercut its support

At first sight, the conventional wisdom seems to be supported in the 2000 election. The Canadian economy appeared to be performing well in the fall of 2000. The unemployment rate in November stood at 6.9 percent, much lower than the 9.1 percent at the time of the 1997 election. Real GDP per capita had increased by an average of 3.5 percent per year during the Liberal mandate, and real disposable income by 2.3 percent.<sup>15</sup> And the incumbent Liberal party did increase its share of the vote, so it is tempting to attribute the Liberal success to the economic good times.

What really matters, though, is how voters themselves **perceived** the economy (Nadeau et al. 2000). Canadians were in fact quite sanguine about the Canadian economy at the time of the election and their judgments were more positive than they had been in 1997. Close to half of the electorate (42 percent) thought that the Canadian economy had improved over the past year, and only 15 percent believed that it had worsened. Similarly, 49 percent said unemployment had gone down, while only 18 percent thought that it had increased. This was a huge change from 1997, when only 17 percent thought that unemployment had declined. And the dominant view was that things would basically stay the same in the following 12 months; only 11 percent were predicting a slowdown, whereas 31 percent foresaw an even better economy. So, clearly, the Canadian economy was perceived to be in good shape.

Canadians were less sanguine about their own personal situation. The majority (55 percent) said that they were financially the same as a year before, 26 percent described themselves as being better off while 20 percent said that they were worse off. Still, perceptions were more positive than they had been in 1997. And Canadians felt better about the future than they had in the previous election. While 55 percent expected no change in the following year, those who did expect a change were much more likely to foresee an improvement (35 percent) than a downturn (9 percent).

So, all in all, economic perceptions were moderately positive. The modal response was “the same” and, except for the personal retrospective dimension, there were many more positive than negative evaluations. Ontarians were more likely to take a rosy view, especially about how the Canadian economy had been doing over the previous year. Differences were more modest with respect to evaluations of personal financial situation (both retrospective and prospective) and there was little difference among the regions when it came to expectations about the Canadian economy. Interestingly enough, on this last dimension, Quebecers came up the most optimistic. Finally, Atlantic Canadians were less likely to see a decline in unemployment. Overall, though, the similarities across regions are more striking than the differences.

The crucial question, of course, concerns the impact of these perceptions on the vote. It turns out to be quite small (see appendices). In Quebec, there is simply no trace of an effect. Outside Quebec, the situation is only slightly different. Among the five economic perception variables included in our study, only one emerges as significant. Everything else being equal, the propensity to vote Liberal increased by three points if a voter thought that his or her personal financial situation had improved, compared with a voter who saw no change. This is really quite a small effect. Moreover, the mean score on this dimension was very close to 0, implying that its net effect on the outcome of the election was minimal.

These results are surprising. There is no support in our survey for the conventional wisdom that the Liberals won the election because the economy was perceived to be in good shape. Many Canadians did feel positive about the economy and relatively few felt negative. The point is, however, that those who felt positive did not vote differently from those who felt negative or neutral, once their partisan predispositions were taken into account.<sup>16</sup>

One possible explanation is the asymmetry hypothesis: voters punish the governing party for bad economic performance but they do not necessarily reward it for good performance (Bloom and Price 1975). However, when we examined the impact of negative and positive economic evaluations separately, there was little indication that negative evaluations were more consequential. It may simply be that the economy is a less salient consideration when it is performing well.

This does not mean that the economy played no role in the 2000 election. It would certainly be difficult to believe that things would **not** have been more difficult for the Liberals if the election had been held during a deep recession. It is simply that economic perceptions failed to have much effect on vote choice at the individual level in this election.

## The Issues

One of the central questions in the election was what should be done with the government surplus, or at least this was how the Prime Minister himself had framed the campaign when he called the election. The Liberals argued in favor of their “balanced” approach. According to the ‘red book’, this involved devoting half of the surplus to increased spending and half to reducing taxes and the federal debt. Meanwhile, the NDP insisted on increased spending on social programs, while the Alliance and the Conservatives both wanted more substantial tax cuts. The Conservatives also committed themselves to paying off the debt in 25 years.

We would expect voters who gave priority to tax cuts (20 percent) to be more inclined to support the Alliance or the Conservatives while those who emphasized social programs (25 percent) would be more inclined to support the NDP.<sup>17</sup> However, views about what should be done with the surplus did not have a statistically significant effect on vote choice. What really mattered were people's more general ideological beliefs about the legitimate role of the market and of government: predictably, those who were supportive of free enterprise thought that there should be significant tax cuts, while those who were more skeptical were more interested in improving social programs. Views about fiscal issues as such did not have an independent impact on vote choice, once these broader values were taken into account.

The same is true of views about the debt. The Conservatives had been the most explicit on this point, with a promise to reimburse the debt over a period of 25 years. It looks as if that promise did not pay any dividends. Only 16 percent of those interviewed were even aware that the Conservatives had made such a promise.

The Alliance did not fare any better with its tough stance on crime. The party seems to have been correct in its assumption that Canadians who want a tougher approach predominate. Almost half (48 percent) favored tougher sentences for young offenders, while only 37 percent argued for spending more on rehabilitation. However, the number favoring a get-tough approach had dropped ten points since 1997. And there was deep division when it came to the question of the death penalty, with 43 percent favoring the death penalty for those convicted of murder and 40 percent opposed. When we combined these two issues into a single crime variable, there was no relationship between toughness on crime and support for the Alliance. In contrast to Reform in 1997, then, the Alliance did not benefit from its position on crime, except in the West and even there the effect was weak. Views on crime, of course, are related to social conservatism, and social conservatism is clearly linked to Alliance support, but not because of its stand on crime. Similarly, the Alliance is not stronger in the West because more people support the death penalty in the West (48 percent) than in Ontario (42 percent).

However, one crime-related issue did have an independent effect on vote choice (at least outside Quebec) and that was gun control. We asked people whether they agreed or disagreed with the rather radical statement that "only the police and the military should be allowed to have guns", which, taken literally, would imply a complete ban on guns, even for hunters. Surprisingly, 57 percent said they agreed, with as many as 40 percent saying they **strongly** agreed. This is a good indication that the principle of gun control is widely accepted in Canada. Interestingly, opinions on gun control were unrelated to views about crime and to social conservatism. On this question, there are substantial differences of opinion between Ontario and Quebec, on the one hand, and the Atlantic provinces and the West, on the other. Canadians also divide along gender and urban-rural lines. Support for a complete ban on guns runs as high as 72 percent among urban Quebec women and as low as 23 percent among rural Western men. Support for gun control significantly increased the odds of voting for the NDP over the Alliance or the Conservatives (see Appendices A and C).

The abortion issue received a lot of attention during the campaign, in part because of Stockwell Day's personal beliefs and in part because the other parties argued that an Alliance government would open the way for a referendum on the issue if as few as 300,000 Canadians put their name to a petition calling for a direct vote. When we asked

our respondents whether they believed it should be very easy, quite easy, quite difficult, or very difficult to get an abortion, almost three-fifths (59 percent) said it should be easy. So this was an issue that could potentially have hurt the Alliance.

Pro-choice voters were indeed less likely than pro-choice voters to opt for the Alliance: outside Quebec, the Alliance won the support of only 26 percent of those who thought it should be easy to get an abortion, compared with 45 percent of pro-life respondents. However, the difference disappeared when prior predispositions were taken into account. Again what seemed to matter was voters' overall social conservatism rather than their specific opinions on abortion.

The other issue that could potentially have hurt the Alliance was immigration. The Reform Party had been associated with the view that the number of immigrants admitted to Canada should be reduced. The Alliance hardly raised the issue in 2000, but that does not preclude the possibility that the anti-immigration perception lingered. This turns out not to be the case. As with so many of the issues raised in the 2000 campaign, general ideological orientations appeared to count more than opinions on a specific issue. Views about immigration were correlated (.23) with more general orientations toward racial minorities and once these were taken into account, there is no evidence that Canadians' views about immigration had any independent effect on vote choice. This was just as well for the Alliance, given the shift in public opinion on this issue. In 1997, almost half (48 percent) of those interviewed thought that Canada should admit fewer immigrants, but three years later, the modal response (47 percent) was to keep immigration at its present level.

If there was one issue that was relevant in the eyes of many voters, it was health. At least two of the parties--the NDP and the Liberals--had made sure that it was near the top of the political agenda. The NDP, in particular, had hammered its message that the Canadian public health system was threatened and that the NDP was the only party that was really committed to maintaining and improving the system. For its part, the Liberal party, chose to attack the Alliance party, arguing that it favored a two-tier system.

The Liberal strategy was successful. Fully half (52 percent) of those interviewed thought that the Alliance was in favor of such a system and 25 percent could not tell. Our data confirm that a majority of Canadians are opposed to the idea of privatization, though with as many as 40 percent in favor of allowing some private hospitals in Canada, the **public** health system is not a sacred cow. Support for a **free** system is much stronger. Only 35 percent of Canadians expressed support for letting doctors charge patients a \$10 dollar fee for each office visit and support declined to 23 percent for a \$20 fee.<sup>18</sup> Those who favored a universal public health system were significantly more likely to vote Liberal and significantly less likely to support the Alliance. According to our estimates, the Alliance lost a full percentage point outside Quebec because of its perceived position on this issue. This is hardly a huge blow but health was one of the reasons that the party failed to make inroads in Ontario.

Not only were the Liberals successful in convincing many voters that they should not trust the Alliance to maintain the public health care system, but they were also able to induce them to vote Liberal rather than NDP. The fact that the NDP failed to attract the votes of those concerned with the Canadian health system is one of the great paradoxes of this election.

Quebeckers are actually more open to some privatization of the health care system than Canadians from other provinces and there is no difference between sovereignists and federalists on this issue. As a consequence, opinions on health only affected the choice between the Liberals and the Conservatives (see Appendix B) and because opinions were almost evenly divided, the issue did not have a net effect on the outcome of the election in Quebec.

If health care hurt the Alliance, the issue of federal powers helped the party. Throughout the campaign, the Liberals emphasized the importance of a strong federal government, while the Alliance, and in Quebec the Bloc, indicated that they were willing to leave more room for the provincial governments. A majority (55 percent) of Canadians seem to be satisfied with the status quo but many more would like to strengthen the provincial government (33 percent) than the federal government (12 percent).<sup>19</sup> Predictably, support for some degree of centralization is a little stronger in Ontario than in the West and Atlantic Canada, but even in Ontario there are slightly more people in favor of a stronger provincial government (21 percent) than a stronger federal government (16 percent). Equally predictably, there is also a correlation (.23) with feelings of regional alienation: those who believe that their province is not fairly treated are more inclined to support some decentralization.

Outside Quebec, those who thought the federal government should have more power were more inclined to vote Liberal while those who would like to strengthen provincial governments were more likely to vote for the Alliance, even controlling for a host of prior dispositions. Since opinion is tilted towards decentralization, this was an issue that benefited the Alliance. According to our estimates, the Alliance may have gained one point thanks to its “decentralizing” stance. Note, however, that this does not explain the lack of success of the Alliance in Ontario. As Appendix C shows, the Ontario/West disparity in Alliance support is almost entirely accounted for by underlying values and beliefs (mostly the latter) and party identification.

The party that was really helped by this issue was the Bloc. In Quebec, almost half (46 percent) indicated that they would like a stronger provincial government, while a bare 8 percent expressed a preference for a stronger federal government. Not surprisingly, views on this matter were strongly related to opinion about sovereignty. Over two-thirds (69 percent) of sovereignists would like a devolution of powers from the federal to the provincial government, while three-fifths (59 percent) of federalists are satisfied with the status quo. Still, there was a substantial minority (30 percent) of federalists who believed that the provincial government should have more power. These “soft nationalists” represent about 20 percent of the total electorate and constitute a pivotal group. Many of them (44 percent) voted for the Liberals, a reminder that views about sovereignty matter more than opinions about the division of power, but an important minority (30 percent) voted for the Bloc. Our results suggest that, everything else being equal, the probability of voting for the Bloc increased by six percentage points when someone shared this view. According to our estimates, the Liberals lost two points to the benefit of the Bloc on this issue.

Critics of the Alliance were quick to point out that the leader of the Alliance had strong beliefs on matters such as abortion and that the Alliance’s stand on direct democracy could well lead to referenda on divisive issues such as abortion. Is there any indication that this attack paid off? While the Reform party had from its very beginning

been an advocate of direct democracy in general and of referenda in particular, this was not a position that the Alliance party actually advocated during the campaign.

The idea of direct democracy has substantial appeal in Canada in the abstract. As many as 66 percent of Canadians think that referenda on **important** issues should be held regularly or occasionally. Perhaps more telling is the fact that the percentage is almost as high (60 percent) when the question deals with **controversial** issues.<sup>20</sup> This positive predisposition significantly erodes, however, in the case of abortion: 50 percent indicated that it would be a bad thing to have a referendum on abortion. So Canadians' views on referenda could best be characterized as ambivalent. They like the idea of being consulted and not letting the politicians decide all the issues but they do not like the idea of getting into acrimonious debates on sensitive issues such as abortion. Interestingly, there is hardly more support for referenda in the West than in Ontario, and views about direct democracy are only very weakly related (.08) to political cynicism.

Opinions on referenda had a small independent impact on vote choice outside Quebec. Everything else being equal, those in favor of referenda were slightly more inclined to vote for the Alliance (especially in the West) and those opposed were more prone to vote for the NDP. However, the net effect on the outcome of the election was nil because opinions on this issue were evenly divided. The issue had no impact in Quebec.

The effect of each of these issues is relatively small. For instance, the propensity to vote Liberal outside Quebec increased by only four points when someone was strongly supportive of the public health system. Still, the combined impact of issues could be substantial: the propensity to vote Liberal increased by 7 points for someone who thought that the federal government should have more power and who was strongly opposed to the privatization of health care. This said, the net overall effect of issues as such on the **outcome** of the election was limited. Our analyses suggest that the Alliance lost one point to the Liberals on health care but won one point at the Liberals' expense on the division of powers. There are two reasons why the net effect of issues was so small. The first is that voters seemed to be making up their minds on the basis of general ideological orientations rather than specific issue positions. To take one example, it was overall views about the merits and limits of free enterprise that matter rather than opinions about taxes. The second reason is that opinions on most issues tended to be divided, so a party often lost as many votes among those who opposed its position as it won among those who supported it. The implication, however, is **not** that issues did not matter: gaining or losing one or two percentage points can mean a lot for a party, especially in a first-past-the post system.

### **Did the Liberal Record Help or Hurt?**

The fact that the Liberal government was re-elected seems to suggest that Canadians were broadly satisfied with what it had done over the previous three years. However, the performance of the Liberal government was judged to be quite good only with respect to the debt and international relations, and it was perceived to be quite poor with respect to health care, taxes, corruption, and defending the interests of Quebec. Health care was the domain which elicited the most negative evaluations (74 percent). Only 21 percent expressed satisfaction with what the government had done. Evaluations were only slightly less negative in the case of taxes, with 64 percent negative ratings and only 30 percent positive ones. And 58 percent thought there had been a lot or some

corruption, and only 31 percent said a little or none.<sup>21</sup> Finally, in Quebec, only 37 percent indicated that the government had done a good job at defending the interests of Quebec. Meanwhile, evaluations of the Liberal performance in creating jobs were only modestly positive. Canadians were willing to give the Liberals some credit for the drop in the unemployment rate during their mandate from 9.1 percent to 6.9 percent, but only a bare majority (54 percent) thought that the Liberals had done a good job and as many as 37 percent thought they had done a poor job on this front.

The crucial question, of course, is whether these evaluations had an independent impact on vote choice. The short answer is that they did, at least outside Quebec. In Quebec voting behavior is so strongly structured by opinions about sovereignty that there is little room left for issues (or the economy) to have any additional impact.<sup>22</sup> Outside Quebec, though, the probability of voting Liberal increased by three to six points when someone thought that the Liberals had done a very good job in a given area and decreased by the same amount if s/he believed they had not done a good job at all (see Appendix C).<sup>23</sup>

On taxes and corruption, the main beneficiary of dissatisfaction with Liberal performance was the Alliance. As we have just seen, opinions on fiscal issues as such did not influence vote choice. What does seem to have mattered is general evaluations of how little the Liberals had cut taxes in the past. There was widespread dissatisfaction to that effect and that dissatisfaction nurtured support for the Alliance. Similarly, those who had come to the conclusion that there had been quite a lot of corruption under the Liberal government were led to vote Alliance, confirming once again that the Alliance vote had a strong protest component. The party was able to attract the support of those who were cynical about politicians in general, who shared a sense of regional alienation, and who thought that there was a lot of corruption under the Liberal government.

Given the centrality of health care to its campaign, the NDP should have been the major beneficiary of dissatisfaction with the Liberal record on health care. Many Canadians felt that the Liberal government had done a poor job of improving health care and this dissatisfaction was directly and strongly related to perceptions that the quality of health care had deteriorated over the past five years. However, the NDP was able to attract the votes of only 16 percent of non-partisans who were both dissatisfied with Liberal performance and opposed to privatization. This was less than half as many as the Liberals (37 percent).

Discontent with their handling of health care certainly cost the Liberals votes: among non-partisans who were satisfied with the Liberals' performance, the party's vote share went up to 50 percent.<sup>24</sup> But it is puzzling that the cost was not higher. One reason is that the federal government did not shoulder all the blame for the problems in the health care system. Voters in general were quite divided when asked which level of government was most responsible for health care getting worse: about one-third (35 percent) pointed to the federal government, one-third (33 percent) to the provincial government, and one-third (32 percent) either could not tell or said both.<sup>25</sup> And only 32 percent of Canadians thought that the main reason the quality of health care had gotten worse was lack of money (that is, federal funding).<sup>26</sup> The fact that many voters believed that the provincial governments were as much (or more) to blame helped to limit the damage for the Liberals. This ability to share (or avoid) the blame was an important ingredient in the Liberal victory. The party's vote share fell to only 23 percent when

dissatisfied non-partisans thought that the federal government was most responsible for the problems in the health care system.

This was not the only area where the Liberals were able to limit the damage caused by negative evaluations of their performance. In contrast to 1997 (Nevitte et al. 2000), the Alliance did not benefit from dissatisfaction with Liberal performance on crime. Assessments of the government performance on crime did not exert any independent impact on vote choice, despite the fact that many voters seemed to consider fighting crime to be a very important issue in the election.<sup>27</sup> This may be because Canadians were quite divided about the best way to go about fighting crime (see issues, above).

On the environment, on the other hand, those who were dissatisfied with the Liberal government were inclined to support the NDP. Indeed, 26 percent of those who said the Liberal government had a very poor record on the environment voted NDP. This is an issue on which the NDP did make some mileage, more so than health which was the main focus of its campaign.

Finally, the Liberals did not appear to benefit from the positive evaluations of their performance with respect to the federal debt and international relations. These evaluations simply did not matter very much when it came to vote choice.

On the three issues that did matter outside Quebec--health, taxes, and corruption--the Liberals were perceived not to have done a good job. Dissatisfaction with respect to taxes and corruption helped to nurture support for the Alliance. In the case of health, however, the Conservatives seem to have been the main beneficiary (and not the NDP). According to our estimates, the Liberals lost about three points because of dissatisfaction on these three issues, to the benefit of the Alliance and (on health) the Conservatives.

The other issue that hurt the Liberals was the decision to call the election itself. There can be little doubt that Jean Chrétien called an early election for no other reason than he believed this was a good time for the party and himself. The Alliance had just elected its new leader and was not ready for a fall election. The Liberals were doing extremely well in the polls, enjoying a huge lead over all the other parties (Blais 2000). And, finally, Mr. Chrétien could put an end to pressures within the Liberal party for him to step down and to let the Finance Minister, Paul Martin, replace him.

Mr. Chrétien seems to have made the decision to go to the polls even though a majority in the Liberal caucus and among his close advisors were arguing against a fall election (*La Presse*, September 27, 2000, A19; *La Presse*, October 5, 2000, A13). Jean Chrétien's advisors were concerned about the so called Peterson effect. In July 1990, David Peterson, the Premier of Ontario, decided to call a snap election at a time when his Liberal party was enjoying a huge lead in the polls. The campaign proved to be disastrous for the Liberals and they lost the election. The lesson seemed to be that voters will react negatively to an election that appears to have been called for purely opportunistic reasons.

Only 10 percent of our respondents indicated that they were very angry at the Prime Minister's decision to call an early election. Another 22 percent said that they were somewhat angry.<sup>28</sup> Even though it was limited to a small group, resentment about the early election call did have an independent effect on vote choice. Relatively few voters expressed anger but for some of them at least this was a crucial consideration. Everything

else being equal, the propensity to vote Liberal declined by 14 points outside Quebec when someone felt very angry about the election call. According to our estimations, it cost the Liberals two or three points. In Quebec as well, resentment about the early election call had a small but significant effect on vote choice, again costing the Liberals two or three percent, to the benefit mostly of the Conservatives. This may have been a small punishment, but some punishment there was.

### **The Leaders**

Canadian elections are not only about choosing which party will form the government, they are also about who is going to be the Prime Minister. There is evidence that how people feel about the leaders is particularly important in Canada (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett 1991; Mendelsohn 1994; Gidengil et al. 2000).

We asked our respondents to tell us how much they liked or disliked each of the party leaders on a scale where 0 meant that they really disliked the leader and 100 that they really liked him or her. What is striking is how small the differences were in the average ratings given to the leaders in the last week of the campaign: Chrétien (48), Clark (47), Day (45), McDonough (46) and Duceppe (48). It is important to understand, though, that there was considerable variability in the ratings, especially of Day and Duceppe. Day was more popular than the Prime Minister in the West, but lagged far behind Chrétien in Atlantic Canada and Ontario. In Quebec, meanwhile, Duceppe was more popular than Chrétien, who even trailed Clark.

The ratings of the leaders were markedly different from 1997. Chrétien's average score outside Quebec in the last week of the campaign was six points below his score in 1997,<sup>29</sup> so clearly the small Liberal gain in votes cannot be attributed to Chrétien's personal popularity. Conversely, McDonough's average score rose by five points in 2000, but this did not prevent the NDP from actually losing ground between 1997 and 2000. Clarke's ratings did go up during the campaign and his strong performance allowed the party to retain its official party status in the House of Commons, but his average rating was five points lower than Charest's in 1997. The opposite pattern applies to Day: his average score was seven points higher than Manning's had been three years before.

Chrétien's average ratings (42) only went down by one point in Quebec and his personal popularity almost rivaled that of Clark (44), in contrast to 1997 when he was trailing Charest by 11 points. As for Duceppe, the widespread perception that he had a much better campaign this time is confirmed; his average score rose by an impressive 10 points.<sup>30</sup>

There was some movement in leader evaluations over the course of the campaign. The leaders who were more popular at the beginning of the campaign (Chrétien and Day) saw their ratings decline and those who were less popular (Clark and McDonough) saw their evaluations improve.<sup>31</sup> The most important change concerned Joe Clark. His ratings initially declined but surged back in the aftermath of the English televised leaders' debate which Clark was clearly perceived to have won. Chrétien, meanwhile, was most often named as the leader who had performed the worst in that debate and his ratings went down by two or three points in the following days. The source of Day's decline is less obvious. The election campaign was a difficult one for the Alliance leader, but his ratings declined by only three points and no specific event seems to be responsible for that decline (see Blais et al. 2001a).

While the average ratings obtained by the five leaders were quite similar in the last week of the campaign, there were marked differences in the percentage of negative evaluations (below 50) that each leader received. Fully half (50 percent) of those interviewed in the final week gave Day a negative rating, compared with fewer than one-third (31 percent) for Chrétien.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps this was Chrétien's greatest achievement: less than one third of the electorate actively disliked him, even though he had been Prime Minister for seven years.

These leader evaluations had a substantial effect on vote choice. Typically, the probability of voting for a party increased by 25 to 30 points when a voter gave its leader a rating of 100, even controlling for causally prior variables. However, feelings about Day had about twice as much impact as feelings about the other leaders, confirming the conventional wisdom that the election was in good part about Stockwell Day.

Our approach allows us to estimate for what fraction of the electorate leaders were a decisive factor. On the basis of the multinomial logit regressions presented in Appendix A, we can determine the party that each respondent is predicted to support, given his/her social background characteristics, values and beliefs, party identification, economic perceptions, issue opinions, evaluations of liberal performance, and evaluations of leaders.<sup>33</sup> We can then compare this prediction with the party that each respondent would be predicted to support if leader ratings had not mattered at all but all other considerations remained the same.<sup>34</sup> If a respondent is predicted to support the same party under both scenarios, we can infer that leaders were **not** decisive in his/her vote choice. Conversely, if the two predictions diverge, we can infer that leader ratings were decisive: but for leader evaluations, the respondent would have voted differently. According to our estimates, leaders played a crucial role in the vote decision of one voter in five (21percent) outside Quebec. This is a very substantial effect. Voters made up their mind in good part on the basis of how they felt about the party leaders. However, the overall **net** impact of leader evaluations on the outcome of the election was quite small. This was because leader evaluations did not differ very much overall.

Leader evaluations may not have affected the actual outcome of the election very much, but they were clearly very important in the vote decision of many individuals so it is important to understand what shaped these evaluations. We tapped voters' perceptions of the leaders' personal qualities by asking them, in the post-election survey, which leader they would describe as: arrogant, trustworthy, having new ideas, compassionate, dishonest, intelligent, extreme, and weak. Table 1 shows the percentage of voters who associated a specific leader with a given trait. The most striking finding is that over 40 percent of voters perceived Chrétien to be arrogant and 25 percent considered him to be dishonest. Meanwhile, outside Quebec, Day was widely perceived (50 percent) to have new ideas, but also to be extreme (45 percent). The images of the other leaders were not as sharply defined. Outside Quebec, Clark was the most likely (24 percent) to be named as being trustworthy, while McDonough was the most likely (31 percent) to be deemed compassionate, but both were perceived to be weak leaders (28 percent and 26 percent, respectively). Few voters in Quebec associated Duceppe with any specific trait.

In Quebec, opinion about sovereignty was the decisive factor in how voters felt about both Chrétien and Duceppe. Traits were only consequential for feelings about the two minor players, Day and Clark. Outside Quebec, personal traits mattered most with

**Table 1: Perceptions of Leaders' Personal Traits**

		Chrétien (%)	Day (%)	Clark (%)	McDonough (%)	Duceppe (%)
Arrogant	Canada	44	22	3	1	3
	Quebec	48	11	3	1	11
	Outside Quebec	42	26	4	1	1
Trustworthy	Canada	17	12	22	11	4
	Quebec	18	9	17	5	16
	Outside Quebec	17	12	24	12	0
New Ideas	Canada	6	46	4	7	2
	Quebec	5	32	4	4	9
	Outside Quebec	7	50	4	8	0
Compassionate	Canada	13	9	12	27	4
	Quebec	9	6	11	16	15
	Outside Quebec	15	11	12	31	0
Dishonest	Canada	25	16	3	1	2
	Quebec	28	8	1	1	6
	Outside Quebec	24	19	3	1	1
Intelligent	Canada	24	11	16	4	4
	Quebec	16	7	12	3	14
	Outside Quebec	26	12	18	5	0
Extreme	Canada	11	43	3	7	5
	Quebec	11	35	2	1	12
	Outside Quebec	11	45	3	9	2
Weak	Canada	6	6	25	25	4
	Quebec	10	6	18	22	13
	Outside Quebec	4	7	28	26	1

Cell entries represent the percentage of respondents saying they would describe the leader as having such a trait.

respect to feelings about Stockwell Day, suggesting that these feelings had a strong personal component. Feelings about Chrétien, on the other hand, were also strongly influenced by cynicism about politics: the more cynical voters were about politics and politicians, the less they liked Chrétien. The three traits that were consistently important in evaluating all of the leaders were “trustworthy”, “dishonest”, and “arrogant”.

According to our estimations, the widespread perception that Chrétien is arrogant reduced his average ratings outside Quebec by three points on a 0 to 100 scale. This image of arrogance is perhaps to be expected for someone who has been at the helm of power for seven years but it may well have been reinforced by Chrétien's decision to call an early election. In Quebec, the negative trait that mattered the most was “dishonest.” The trait was not mentioned as often (only 28 percent) but, even taking into account prior predispositions, those who shared that perception gave the Prime Minister much lower ratings, reducing his average score in Quebec by about three points.

As for Day, he seems to have lost three points because of his image of being extreme but that was made up for by a five point gain for being viewed as having new ideas. Trustworthiness gave Clark's ratings a three-point boost and compassion did the same for McDonough, but each received a two point penalty for their perceived weakness.<sup>35</sup> In the case of Duceppe, no specific trait appears to have struck voters.

There remains the question of Stockwell Day's religious convictions. Were they a factor in voters' feelings towards him and did this hurt Day? As expected, those who believed that the bible is the actual word of God were more likely to like Stockwell Day: outside Quebec, his mean rating was 55 among Christian fundamentalists, but only 39 among other respondents. Since the latter group was much larger, this implies a negative net effect. It could be, of course, that this difference reflected not Day's religious convictions, but the party that he was leading. However, views about the bible were only weakly related to evaluations of Manning in 1993 (the question about the bible was not asked in 1997): Manning's mean rating outside Quebec was 52 among those who believed that the bible should be taken word for word and 49 among those who disagreed. Clearly, Day was more disliked among the latter than Manning had been in 1993. The obvious inference is that Day was hurt by the fact that a clear majority of Canadians reject Christian fundamentalist beliefs.

Indeed, according to our estimations, even allowing for social background characteristics and partisan orientations, Stockwell Day's ratings were 10 points lower among those who strongly disagreed with the statement that the bible is the word of God. Given that these strong skeptics represented about 40 percent of the electorate, this suggests that Day's ratings were about four points lower than they would have been if his religious convictions had played no role in voters' assessments.

Day's religious views were particularly important for the widespread perception that he was "extreme". Forty-five percent of respondents outside Quebec named Stockwell Day as extreme. The percentage reached 67 percent among those who disagreed strongly with the view that the bible is the actual word of God.

These findings beg the question: did Day's religious beliefs come to play an important role because the media decided to focus on them? If so, we would expect to see the relationship strengthen as the campaign progressed. Systematic assessments of the impact of the media would require more complex analyses than we can provide here but some pieces of evidence suggest that it may be misleading to blame the media. The relationship between religious beliefs and vote intention was basically the same in the first and second halves of the campaign. After the debates, 30 percent of those who disagreed that the bible should be taken word for word intended to vote Alliance (outside Quebec), almost the same percentage (31 percent) as before the debates.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, time-series analysis of vote intentions suggests that the CBC special documentary on "Fundamental Day" had no lasting impact on the vote. Concerns about Day's religious beliefs were there from the very beginning.

### **Did Strategic Voting Hurt the Weaker Parties?**

In a first-past-the-post electoral system like Canada's, some voters may vote for a party other than the one they really prefer because they do not want to "waste" their vote on a party that has little chance of winning in their constituency. Rather than vote for their most-preferred party, they vote for the party that is perceived to have the best

chances of defeating the most disliked party/candidate (Blais and Nadeau 1996; Blais et al. 2001b).

In order to assess the degree of strategic voting in the 2000 election, we asked respondents to estimate each party's chances of winning in their constituency, using a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 meant no chance at all and 100 meant certain victory. The aggregate perceptions were broadly accurate.<sup>37</sup> The Liberals were perceived to be ahead in every region except the West where the Alliance was (correctly) viewed as the strongest party. The Conservatives' chances were predicted to be much better in Atlantic Canada and to be particularly bleak in Quebec. And Quebecers expected a close fight between the Liberals and the Bloc. Interestingly, though, voters tended to overestimate the chances of the smaller parties and to underestimate those of the Liberals. The Liberals won 57 percent of the seats but their mean chances were perceived to be only 39 percent. Conversely, the Conservatives and the NDP won only 4 percent of the seats but voters gave them almost a 15 percent chance of winning, on average.<sup>38</sup>

There is, of course, a substantial amount of wishful thinking among those who identify with a party and this leads them to overestimate its chances of winning (Uhlener and Grofman 1986). More detailed analysis confirms that voters' perceptions were influenced by their partisan orientations.<sup>39</sup> The typical bias in favor of their party was 8 points. The bias was higher among voters who were less well informed. Among the better informed, the actual vote obtained by the party in the respondent's constituency in the 1997 election had a greater impact. Alliance partisans exhibited the most wishful thinking. They were expecting to win about 30 percent of the constituencies in Ontario, and many of them must have been deeply disappointed with the outcome of the election. This may well explain why many of them subsequently raised questions about Stockwell Day's leadership.

The real question, though, is whether the perception that a party had little chance of winning in a constituency induced some voters to vote for a party other than the one they preferred the most and whether this hurt the less competitive parties. To answer this question, we need a measure of voters' preferences among the parties. These preferences are assumed to be reflected in their overall evaluations of the parties, the leaders, and the local candidates, as well as in their party identification (Blais et al. 2001b). If strategic considerations matter, vote choice should depend not only on these preferences but also on whether the voter thinks that a given party has any chance of winning in his/her constituency.

We tested this hypothesis by relating vote choice outside Quebec to the four dimensions of preferences (evaluations of parties, leaders, local candidates, and party identification) and to perceptions of the race. Overall evaluations of the parties and leaders were measured on a 0 to 100 scale where 100 means that the respondents really liked the party or leader and 0 means that s/he really disliked them. Party identification was a dummy variable that took the value of 1 if the respondent thought of her(him)self as a Liberal, Alliance, Conservative, NDP or Bloc supporter. Feeling about local candidates was also a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent indicated particularly liking the local candidate. Perceptions of the race were tapped through the NO CHANCE variables. These indicate how much a party was perceived to be trailing in a constituency. NO CHANCE equals 0 if a party was perceived to be ahead or tied for first place and equals the distance between the chances of the top contender and those of

the party if the party was perceived to be behind. The higher its value, the more hopeless the perceived chances.

**Table 2: The Impact of Perceptions of Chances of Winning on Vote Choice Outside Quebec (Multinomial Logit)**

	<b>Alliance vs. Liberal</b>	<b>Conservative vs. Liberal</b>	<b>NDP vs. Liberal</b>
Atlantic	-1.07 (.79)	.17 (.51)	.34 (.60)
West	-.33 (.52)	-.04 (.47)	.50 (.47)
<b>Leader evaluations</b>			
Chretien	-3.50 (1.44) <sup>b</sup>	-3.39 (1.25) <sup>a</sup>	-1.44 (1.18)
Day	6.72 (1.76) <sup>a</sup>	-.69 (1.28)	-2.01 (1.17) <sup>c</sup>
Clark	.16 (1.40)	5.86 (1.34) <sup>a</sup>	-.25 (1.35)
Mc Donough	.07 (1.44)	-.12 (1.15)	2.09 (1.24) <sup>c</sup>
<b>Party evaluations</b>			
Liberal	-9.13 (1.58) <sup>a</sup>	-6.55 (1.39) <sup>a</sup>	-6.97 (1.34) <sup>a</sup>
Alliance	8.34 (1.55) <sup>a</sup>	1.23 (1.24)	1.31 (1.10)
Conservative	-1.87 (1.43)	3.75 (1.28) <sup>a</sup>	-.47 (1.22)
NDP	1.07 (1.33)	.69 (1.05)	5.10 (1.06) <sup>a</sup>
<b>Feelings about local candidates</b>			
Liberal	-2.15 (.62) <sup>a</sup>	-.71 (.41) <sup>c</sup>	-1.66 (.59) <sup>a</sup>
Alliance	1.61 (.93) <sup>c</sup>	-.73 (1.04)	-33.51 ( $\infty$ )
Conservative	.43 (1.11)	2.43 (.64) <sup>a</sup>	1.04 (.90)
NDP	.04 (1.24)	-36.71 ( $\infty$ )	2.06 (.63) <sup>a</sup>
<b>Party identification</b>			
Liberal	-.90 (.50) <sup>c</sup>	-.66 (.41)	-1.14 (.50) <sup>b</sup>
Alliance	34.44 ( $\infty$ )	-.02 ( $\infty$ )	1.00 ( $\infty$ )
Conservative	1.16 (.72)	1.59 (.56) <sup>a</sup>	.03 (1.00)
NDP	-3.30 (1.55) <sup>b</sup>	-.21 (.84)	1.51 (.52) <sup>a</sup>
<b>No chance</b>			
Liberal	.15 (1.21)	-.58 (1.04)	.93 (.88)
Alliance	-2.33 (1.18) <sup>b</sup>	.10 (.90)	.73 (.88)
Conservative	1.19 (1.39)	-1.53 (1.00)	1.42 (1.17)
NDP	-.26 (1.27)	1.62 (1.06)	-1.48 (.86) <sup>c</sup>
Constant	.03 (.92)	-1.11 (.87)	.27 (.87)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.73	
Log likelihood		-339.33	
N		1019	

a: significant  $\hat{\alpha} \leq .01$ ; b: significant  $\hat{\alpha} \leq .05$ ; c: significant  $\hat{\alpha} \leq .10$

In fact, most of the NO CHANCE variables turned out not to be statistically significant (see table 2). This indicates that strategic considerations were not very important in this election. The only exceptions perhaps were the Alliance and possibly the NDP, but even then strategic considerations played a minor role. Our data suggest that as few as 1 percent of the voters voted for a party that was not their preferred one.<sup>40</sup> We repeated the same analysis for vote choice in Quebec. In this case, the results are even more clear-cut: none of the NO CHANCE variables proved to be significant. In Quebec, there is no evidence of any strategic voting at all.

## Discussion

Our study challenges some of the conventional wisdom about voting behavior in Canada. First, it shows that social cleavages matter. It would be impossible to understand the Liberal victory in the 2000 election without recognizing the extent to which their strength outside Quebec hinges on the support of Catholics and Canadians of non-European origin. These two groups constitute the core of Liberal support outside Quebec. Fifty-four percent of Catholics and 70 percent of Canadians of non-European origin voted Liberal. The Liberal lead outside Quebec is thus heavily dependent on the strong support of these two groups. Without them, the seven-point lead obtained by the Liberals over the Alliance outside Quebec would translate into a five-point edge for the Alliance. In Ontario, the huge 28-point Liberal lead would shrink by almost half. It is true that only two social background characteristics were electorally relevant in Quebec--language and age--but their effects were powerful.

Second, our study confirms that ideology matters to vote choice. Because of the dominating nature of the sovereignty debate in Quebec, there is little room left for other values to play a significant role. Outside Quebec, though, the most powerful division revolved around free enterprise: those who were skeptical of the system tended to vote Liberal or NDP, while those who were more sanguine were inclined to vote Alliance or Conservative. Few Canadians may refer to politics in terms like “left” and “right”, or understand what they really mean, but their views about the virtues and the vices of the free market economy affect their vote. The second most important ideological dimension was social conservatism, with social conservatives being particularly inclined to vote for the Alliance.

Even though values affected individual vote choice, their impact on the overall outcome of the election tended to be small. The main reason for this is that Canadians seem to be about evenly divided on questions like free enterprise and social conservatism. There is one important exception. Views about sovereignty were critical to the Liberal victory in Quebec: the Liberals won in that province because there were many more federalists than sovereignists.

On the other hand, cynicism and regional alienation clearly hurt the Liberals and these two factors help to explain why the Liberal victory was a small one. Many Canadians expressed deep cynicism about politicians in general and these people were less inclined to vote for the incumbent Liberals. Quite a few also believed that their own province or region is being treated unfairly and that perception fuelled support for the Alliance and the Bloc.

Party identification was clearly an important part of the explanation for the Liberals' success. About 30 percent of voters outside Quebec think of themselves as

Liberals. Assuming that about 85 percent of them will normally vote Liberal, the Liberals can more or less count on a core of 25 percent. That is at least twice as much as any other party, meaning that the Liberals start an election with a lead of more than ten points over their nearest rival. The challenge for them is to do as well as any other party among non-partisans. And this is precisely what they did in 2000. Indeed, the Liberals (38 percent) actually managed to outpoll the Alliance (33 percent) among non-partisans outside Quebec. Added to their core of loyal voters, this assured them a seven-point lead, enough to win a clear majority of the seats.

There are almost as many loyal Liberal supporters in Quebec, but the Bloc has as many partisans as the Liberals. Moreover, the concentration of Liberal identifiers in ridings where non-francophones predominate means that the Liberal vote share has to be at least six or seven percentage points higher than the Bloc in order to win a majority of the seats (Massicotte and Blais 1999). Among non-partisans, the two parties are tied at 37 percent in our sample. As our survey underestimates Liberal support, it is plausible to assume that the Liberals had a small edge among non-partisans, enough to give them a plurality of the vote in Quebec, but not enough to win a majority of the seats.

The fact that over half the party identifiers in Canada are Liberals provides the party with a huge advantage. This is not to imply that the Liberals are certain to win any election, but it does mean that the other parties start with a serious handicap. It is possible for the Liberals to lose an election if short-term factors are against them. In 2000, one potentially critical short-term factor was clearly in the Liberals' favor: the economy was doing well. However, this is not the reason the Liberals won the election. Indeed, they failed to reap any significant advantage from positive evaluations of the economy.

Issues also had surprisingly little impact. There were two notable exceptions. Health was clearly an important issue. Those who were more supportive of the public health system were more inclined to vote Liberal and those who favored some degree of privatization or user fees were more likely to vote for the Alliance. Views about the relative role of the federal and provincial governments also mattered. However, opinions about crime, abortion, and fiscal issues failed to have an independent effect on vote choice. And there is no evidence that some issues became more important as the campaign progressed.

One intuitively plausible interpretation of the election is that Canadians re-elected the Liberals because they were broadly satisfied with what the Liberal government had done over the previous three years. However, our findings cast doubt on this interpretation. On the three issues that mattered the most--health, taxes, and corruption--there was widespread dissatisfaction and that dissatisfaction cost the Liberals some votes. The Liberals also lost some votes among those who resented the Prime Minister's decision to call an early election. If it had not been for this discontent, the Liberals would have won a sweeping victory.

The Liberals won **despite** the dissatisfaction with their performance. There were basically two reasons for this. The first and most obvious one is that those who were dissatisfied split their votes among the opposition parties. The second is that the Liberals started with a substantial edge among partisans. Thanks to that edge, they could manage to win an election even though many Canadians were not really satisfied with what they had been doing.

At the same time, it is probably true that the Liberals were re-elected because there was no **deep** discontent with their policies and performance. From that perspective, health was a crucial issue. Canadians were very concerned about the perceived deterioration in health care in the recent past and they expressed widespread dissatisfaction with Liberal performance in this area. That dissatisfaction did not result in the repudiation of the Liberals, though, in part because there was no consensus on what should be done and in part because Canadians felt that the blame had to be shared with the provincial governments.

Leaders were on voters' minds when they decided which party to support and for one voter in five they proved decisive. Feelings about Stockwell Day were particularly important. His religious beliefs were a source of concern for some Canadians and this helped to make him a less appealing leader. Still, the impact of religion should not be overstated. In the last week of the campaign, Day was as popular as Chrétien among non-partisans and more popular than Manning had been in 1997. And while religious fundamentalism did hurt the Alliance, its net impact was limited. Indeed, no leader was markedly more popular or unpopular than the others, and as a consequence their net overall impact on the outcome of the election was quite small.

Finally, there was very little strategic voting in the 2000 election. This is not good news for the Conservatives and the NDP, in particular. We find no evidence that some voters liked these parties but refrained from voting for them because they thought they had no chance of winning in their constituency. The great majority of Canadians voted for the party they liked the most (or disliked the least). The problem, for the Conservatives and the NDP is that they were the first choice of so few people.

The election left one major question unresolved: who will win the so-called "fight for the right". Our findings drive home the point that it is misleading to talk about "the right" in Canada. Alliance and Conservative voters converge in their views about the market, but part company when it comes to social conservatism. And while the correlation between values and vote choice is strongest for the Alliance, it is weakest for the Conservatives. In that sense, the Alliance appears to be the most ideologically oriented of the federal parties, while the Conservatives are the least ideologically oriented. This is yet another indication that the two parties have different clienteles.

However, the most telling indication comes from an analysis of Canadians' second choices.<sup>41</sup> The Conservatives were the most frequent second choice of Alliance (and Liberal) voters, but the Liberals, not the Alliance, were the most frequent second choice of Conservative (and NDP) voters.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, the Alliance was the second choice of only 9 percent in the country as a whole and 8 percent outside Quebec. This is a clear sign of the party's limited growth potential. Outside Quebec, the Alliance received 33 percent of the vote. Our data suggest that the most they could have hoped for was about 40 percent. By contrast, the Conservatives only received 15 percent of the vote, but the percentage finding the party acceptable was about the same as for the Alliance, around 40 percent.

The problem confronting the Alliance was that so many voters deemed the party to be completely **unacceptable**. The best indication of this is that 27 percent of Canadians named the Alliance when asked if there was any party that was just too extreme. No other party received more than 10 percent.

These patterns are very similar to those observed in the 1997 election (Nevitte et al. 2000, 16, Table 2.3). In 1997, only 18 percent of Conservative voters chose Reform as their second choice outside Quebec; in 2000, only 17 percent chose the Alliance. Outside Quebec, 24 percent spontaneously referred to Reform in 1997 as being too extreme; the Alliance percentage was 28 percent in 2000. In voters' minds, the Alliance party was very much a continuation of the Reform party.<sup>43</sup>

There is no guarantee, then, that a new party resulting from the merger of the Conservatives and the Alliance would get the support of the two former parties. Conservative voters are closer to the centre than to the right and many of them might be tempted to go to the Liberals. The reaction of Conservative voters to the creation of a new right-wing party will depend very much on how moderate the new party is perceived to be. What is clear is that without a resolution of this question, the Liberals are going to be difficult to defeat next time around.

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
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
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**Figure 2: The Distribution of Party Identification, 2000**



**Figure 3: Party Identification and Vote, 2000**



**Appendix A: Alliance versus Liberal Vote Choice Outside Quebec (multinomial estimation)**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>							
Atlantic	-.74 <sup>b</sup>	-.99 <sup>a</sup>	-.94 <sup>b</sup>	-.95 <sup>b</sup>	-1.09 <sup>a</sup>	-.98 <sup>b</sup>	-1.08 <sup>c</sup>
West	1.27 <sup>a</sup>	.84 <sup>a</sup>	.38	.37	.25	.26	.36
Catholic	-.78 <sup>a</sup>	-.83 <sup>a</sup>	-.69 <sup>a</sup>	-.67 <sup>a</sup>	-.58 <sup>b</sup>	-.46 <sup>c</sup>	-.39
Non-religious	-.63 <sup>a</sup>	-.39	-.47	-.44	-.36	-.18	-.74
North European	.54 <sup>a</sup>	.41 <sup>c</sup>	.52 <sup>c</sup>	.57 <sup>c</sup>	.56 <sup>c</sup>	.61 <sup>c</sup>	.53
Non-European	-1.67 <sup>a</sup>	-1.62 <sup>a</sup>	-1.16 <sup>b</sup>	-1.13 <sup>b</sup>	-1.04 <sup>b</sup>	-.99 <sup>b</sup>	-.72
Male	.54 <sup>a</sup>	.37 <sup>b</sup>	.10	.12	.08	.01	-.20
Other Language	-.60 <sup>a</sup>	-.81 <sup>a</sup>	-.63 <sup>c</sup>	-.63 <sup>c</sup>	-.58 <sup>c</sup>	-.54	-.74
Married	.36 <sup>b</sup>	.17	.21	.22	.17	.02	.25
Below High-School	-.04	-.30	-.04	-.09	-.09	-.01	-.47
Rural	.61 <sup>a</sup>	.51 <sup>b</sup>	.29	.28	.29	.22	.79 <sup>b</sup>
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>							
Social Conservatism		.67 <sup>a</sup>	.37 <sup>b</sup>	.32 <sup>c</sup>	.21	.17	.10
Free enterprise		.91 <sup>a</sup>	.59 <sup>c</sup>	.65 <sup>b</sup>	.61 <sup>c</sup>	.71 <sup>b</sup>	-.44
Racial minorities		-.53 <sup>a</sup>	-.58 <sup>b</sup>	-.53 <sup>b</sup>	-.49 <sup>b</sup>	-.49 <sup>b</sup>	-.24
Feminism		-.64 <sup>a</sup>	-.46 <sup>b</sup>	-.48 <sup>c</sup>	-.47 <sup>a</sup>	-.48 <sup>b</sup>	-.43
Religiosity		.06	.12	.12	.19	.19	-.04
Regional alienation		.69 <sup>a</sup>	.46 <sup>c</sup>	.42 <sup>c</sup>	.41	.10	.18
Cynicism		.89 <sup>a</sup>	.53 <sup>c</sup>	.53 <sup>c</sup>	.43	.10	.37
<b>3. Party Identification</b>							
Liberal			-2.18 <sup>a</sup>	-2.18 <sup>a</sup>	-2.09 <sup>a</sup>	-2.13 <sup>a</sup>	-1.55 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			26.52 <sup>a</sup>	26.52 <sup>a</sup>	26.31 <sup>a</sup>	26.18 <sup>a</sup>	26.39 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			1.25 <sup>a</sup>	1.26 <sup>a</sup>	1.20 <sup>a</sup>	1.12 <sup>a</sup>	1.70 <sup>a</sup>
New Democrat			-1.52 <sup>b</sup>	-1.56 <sup>b</sup>	-1.51 <sup>b</sup>	-1.56 <sup>b</sup>	-1.46
<b>4. Economy</b>							
Retrospective evaluation				-.31 <sup>b</sup>	-.25	-.14	-.23
<b>5. Issues</b>							
Federal powers					-.48 <sup>a</sup>	-.37 <sup>b</sup>	-.16
Public health					-.42 <sup>a</sup>	-.48 <sup>a</sup>	-.38 <sup>c</sup>
Gun control					-.08	-.06	.04
Direct democracy					.24	.30 <sup>c</sup>	.20
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>							
Environment						.12	.44
Health						-.38	-.43
Taxes						.73 <sup>a</sup>	-.38
Corruption						-.46 <sup>b</sup>	.00
Early call						1.31 <sup>a</sup>	.76
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>							
Chrétien							-3.77 <sup>a</sup>
Day							6.43 <sup>a</sup>
Clark							-.60
McDonough							-.11
Constant	-.93 <sup>a</sup>	-.61 <sup>b</sup>	-.17	-.15	-.11	-.57	-.27
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.22	.46	.46	.48	.50	.65
Log likelihood	-1412.54	-1189.37	-819.43	-813.90	-790.54	-745.12	-516.86
N	1280	1221	1217	1215	1202	1193	1181

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix A2. Multinomial Estimation of PC versus Liberal Vote Choice Outside Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>							
Atlantic	1.06 <sup>a</sup>	.91 <sup>a</sup>	.88 <sup>a</sup>	.90 <sup>a</sup>	.87 <sup>a</sup>	1.00 <sup>a</sup>	1.22 <sup>a</sup>
West	.33	.05	.15	.16	.17	.31	-.07
Catholic	-.89 <sup>a</sup>	-.92 <sup>a</sup>	-.70 <sup>c</sup>	-.72 <sup>a</sup>	-.60 <sup>b</sup>	-.53 <sup>c</sup>	-.44
Non-religious	-.42	-.62 <sup>c</sup>	-.66 <sup>c</sup>	-.66 <sup>c</sup>	-.63 <sup>c</sup>	-.47	-.58
North European	-.37	-.43 <sup>b</sup>	-.07	-.05	-.02	-.11	-.06
Non-European	-1.32 <sup>a</sup>	-1.22 <sup>b</sup>	-1.10 <sup>c</sup>	-1.11 <sup>b</sup>	-1.08 <sup>c</sup>	-1.19 <sup>b</sup>	-.32
Male	-.15	-.24	-.26	-.29	-.32	-.35	-.63 <sup>b</sup>
Other Language	-.56 <sup>c</sup>	-.74 <sup>b</sup>	-.53	-.56	-.52	-.54	-.79
Married	.07	.14	.14	.14	.14	-.03	-.19
Below High-School	-.78 <sup>b</sup>	-.84 <sup>b</sup>	-.62 <sup>c</sup>	-.61	-.55	-.47	-.80
Rural	.27	.25	.10	.09	.06	-.03	.25
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>							
Social Conservatism		-.09	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.05	.17
Free enterprise		.86 <sup>a</sup>	.59 <sup>c</sup>	.57	.54	.79 <sup>b</sup>	.60
Racial minorities		-.28	-.17	-.18	-.11	-.12	-.02
Feminism		.05	.06	.06	.06	.06	.17
Religiosity		-.22	-.11	-.10	-.09	-.04	-.06
Regional alienation		-.20	-.10	-.10	-.11	-.47	-.53
Cynicism		.82 <sup>a</sup>	.45 <sup>b</sup>	.49	.49	.06	-.00
<b>3. Party Identification</b>							
Liberal			-1.84 <sup>a</sup>	-1.85 <sup>a</sup>	-1.85 <sup>a</sup>	-1.73 <sup>a</sup>	-1.35 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			22.05 <sup>a</sup>	22.07 <sup>a</sup>	21.98 <sup>a</sup>	21.81 <sup>a</sup>	22.87 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			2.85 <sup>a</sup>	2.85 <sup>a</sup>	2.84 <sup>a</sup>	2.76 <sup>a</sup>	2.27 <sup>a</sup>
New Democrat			-.69	-.67	-.57	-.66	-.49
<b>4. Economy</b>							
Retrospective evaluation				.13	.11	.22	.36
<b>5. Issues</b>							
Federal powers					.08	.14	-.08
Public health					-.28 <sup>c</sup>	-.32 <sup>c</sup>	-.31
Gun control					-.06	-.03	-.13
Direct democracy					-.02	.05	.25
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>							
Environment						-.46 <sup>b</sup>	-.07
Health						-.75 <sup>b</sup>	-.86 <sup>b</sup>
Taxes						-.50 <sup>b</sup>	-.47 <sup>c</sup>
Corruption						-.31	-.17
Early call						.73 <sup>c</sup>	.29
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>							
Chrétien							-2.51 <sup>a</sup>
Day							.33
Clark							3.95 <sup>a</sup>
McDonough							.09
Constant	-.85 <sup>a</sup>	-.55 <sup>b</sup>	-.50 <sup>c</sup>	-.51	-.45	-.96 <sup>b</sup>	-.91 <sup>c</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.22	.46	.46	.48	.50	.65
Log likelihood	-1412.54	-1189.37	-819.43	-813.90	-790.54	-745.12	-516.86
N	1280	1221	1217	1215	1202	1193	1181

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix A3. Multinomial Estimation of NDP versus Liberal Vote Choice Outside Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>							
Atlantic	.76 <sup>a</sup>	.65 <sup>c</sup>	.88 <sup>b</sup>	.93 <sup>b</sup>	.95 <sup>b</sup>	1.20 <sup>a</sup>	.87 <sup>c</sup>
West	.85 <sup>a</sup>	.86 <sup>a</sup>	.90 <sup>a</sup>	.91 <sup>a</sup>	1.00 <sup>a</sup>	1.06 <sup>a</sup>	.96 <sup>b</sup>
Catholic	-.19	-.17	.34	.37	.46	.52	.60
Non-religious	.94 <sup>a</sup>	.17	.08	.09	.12	.27	.23
North European	.08	.25	.30	.39	.44	.39	.25
Non-European	-1.06 <sup>a</sup>	-.75	-.50	-.31	-.36	-.15	.28
Male	-.44 <sup>a</sup>	-.41 <sup>c</sup>	-.36	-.33	-.27	-.48	-.30
Other Language	-.63 <sup>b</sup>	-.48	-.21	-.24	-.38	-.32	-.89 <sup>c</sup>
Married	-.47 <sup>b</sup>	-.26	-.24	-.28	-.28	-.50 <sup>c</sup>	-.42
Below High-School	.33	.46	.00	-.02	.10	.14	.09
Rural	.05	.00	-.27	-.31	-.26	-.24	.04
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>							
Social Conservatism		-.45 <sup>b</sup>	-.31	-.39	-.40	-.34	-.30
Free enterprise		-2.06 <sup>a</sup>	-1.65 <sup>a</sup>	-1.55 <sup>a</sup>	-1.54 <sup>a</sup>	-1.44 <sup>a</sup>	-1.37 <sup>a</sup>
Racial minorities		.17	.11	.13	.13	.13	-.07
Feminism		.05	.12	.14	.08	.05	.03
Religiosity		-.43 <sup>b</sup>	-.36	-.37 <sup>c</sup>	-.34	-.38	-.32
Regional alienation		.35	.26	.18	.09	-.03	-.16
Cynicism		1.26 <sup>a</sup>	.92 <sup>a</sup>	.80 <sup>b</sup>	.94 <sup>b</sup>	.47	.26
<b>3. Party Identification</b>							
Liberal			-1.56 <sup>a</sup>	-1.53 <sup>a</sup>	-1.52 <sup>a</sup>	-1.55 <sup>a</sup>	-1.31 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			-12.43	-6.43	-6.52	-6.41	-9.40
Conservative			.48	.47	.47	.40	.53
New Democrat			2.91 <sup>a</sup>	2.86 <sup>a</sup>	2.87 <sup>a</sup>	2.78 <sup>a</sup>	2.14 <sup>a</sup>
<b>4. Economy</b>							
Retrospective evaluation				-.47 <sup>b</sup>	-.57 <sup>a</sup>	-.53 <sup>b</sup>	-.50 <sup>b</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>							
Federal powers					-.14	-.16	-.10
Public health					-.16	-.05	-.00
Gun control					-.37 <sup>b</sup>	.38 <sup>b</sup>	.38 <sup>b</sup>
Direct democracy					-.40 <sup>c</sup>	-.30	-.22
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>							
Environment						-.79 <sup>a</sup>	-.55 <sup>c</sup>
Health						.24	.18
Taxes						-.19	-.12
Corruption						-.05	-.15
Early call						1.16 <sup>b</sup>	.75
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>							
Chrétien							-1.86 <sup>a</sup>
Day							.16
Clark							-.19
McDonough							2.79 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	-1.18 <sup>a</sup>	-1.65 <sup>a</sup>	-1.82 <sup>a</sup>	-1.80 <sup>a</sup>	-1.96 <sup>a</sup>	-2.08 <sup>a</sup>	-1.82 <sup>a</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.22	.46	.46	.48	.50	.65
Log likelihood	-1412.54	-1189.37	-819.43	-813.90	-790.54	-745.12	-516.86
N	1280	1221	1217	1215	1202	1193	1181

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix A4. Multinomial Estimation of Alliance versus PC Vote Choice Outside Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>							
Atlantic	-1.80 <sup>a</sup>	-1.90 <sup>a</sup>	-1.82 <sup>a</sup>	-1.85 <sup>a</sup>	-1.96 <sup>a</sup>	-1.99 <sup>a</sup>	-2.30 <sup>a</sup>
West	.93 <sup>a</sup>	0.80 <sup>a</sup>	.23	.21	.08	-.05	.43
Catholic	.11	.09	.02	.05	.02	.06	.04
Non-religious	-.20	.23	.18	.21	.27	.29	-.15
North European	.91 <sup>a</sup>	.84 <sup>b</sup>	.60	.62	.58	.72 <sup>c</sup>	.59
Non-European	-.35	-.40	-.06	-.02	.05	.20	-.39
Male	.69 <sup>a</sup>	.61 <sup>a</sup>	.36	.41	.41	.36	.44
Other Language	-.04	-.07	-.10	-.07	-.05	.00	.06
Married	.29	.04	.07	.07	.03	.04	.44
Below High School	.75 <sup>b</sup>	.54	.58	.52	.46	.46	.32
Rural	.34	.26	.19	.19	.23	.25	.53
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>							
Social Conservatism		.59 <sup>a</sup>	.39 <sup>c</sup>	.33	.25	.22	-.07
Free enterprise		.05	-.01	.08	.06	-.09	-1.05 <sup>c</sup>
Racial minorities		-.25	-.41	-.35	-.37	-.37	-.22
Feminism		-.69 <sup>a</sup>	-.51 <sup>b</sup>	-.53 <sup>b</sup>	-.53 <sup>b</sup>	-.54 <sup>b</sup>	-.60 <sup>b</sup>
Religiosity		.28	.23	.22	.28	.24	.02
Regional alienation		.49 <sup>b</sup>	.58 <sup>b</sup>	.52 <sup>c</sup>	.51 <sup>c</sup>	.57 <sup>c</sup>	.71 <sup>c</sup>
Cynicism		.07	.08	-.04	-.05	.04	.37
<b>3. Party Identification</b>							
Liberal			-.34	-.32	-.25	-.40	-.19
Alliance			4.47 <sup>a</sup>	4.46 <sup>a</sup>	4.34 <sup>a</sup>	4.37 <sup>a</sup>	3.52 <sup>b</sup>
Conservative			-1.60 <sup>a</sup>	-1.59 <sup>a</sup>	-1.64 <sup>a</sup>	-1.64 <sup>a</sup>	-.56
New Democrat			-.83	-.89	-.94	-.89	-.97
<b>4. Economy</b>							
Retrospective evaluation				-.44 <sup>b</sup>	-.36 <sup>c</sup>	-.36 <sup>c</sup>	-.59 <sup>b</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>							
Federal powers					-.56 <sup>a</sup>	-.51 <sup>b</sup>	-.08
Public health					-.13	-.15	-.07
Gun control					-.02	-.03	.17
Direct democracy					.26	.25	-.05
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>							
Environment						.59 <sup>b</sup>	.51
Health						.37	.43
Taxes						-.23	.09
Corruption						-.15	.18
Early call						.58	.47
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>							
Chrétien							-1.26 <sup>b</sup>
Day							6.10 <sup>a</sup>
Clark							-4.55 <sup>a</sup>
McDonough							-.20
Constant	.08	.06 <sup>a</sup>	-.33	-.35	.34	.39	.64
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.22	.46	.46	.48	.50	.65
Log likelihood	-1412.54	-1189.37	-819.43	-813.90	-790.54	-745.12	-516.86
N	1280	1221	1217	1215	1202	1193	1181

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix A5. Multinomial Estimation of Alliance versus NDP Vote Choice Outside Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>							
Atlantic	-1.50 <sup>a</sup>	-1.64 <sup>a</sup>	-1.83 <sup>a</sup>	-1.88 <sup>a</sup>	-2.04 <sup>a</sup>	-2.18 <sup>a</sup>	-1.94 <sup>a</sup>
West	.42 <sup>c</sup>	-.02	-.52	-.54	-.75 <sup>b</sup>	-.80 <sup>b</sup>	-.60
Catholic	-.60 <sup>b</sup>	-.66 <sup>b</sup>	-1.02 <sup>a</sup>	-1.04 <sup>a</sup>	-1.04 <sup>a</sup>	-.98 <sup>a</sup>	-1.00 <sup>b</sup>
Non-religious	-1.56 <sup>a</sup>	-.55 <sup>c</sup>	-.55	-.54	-.48	-.45	-.97
North European	.46	.17	.23	.18	.12	.22	.28
Non-European	-.61	-.88	-.66	-.82	-.67	-.84	-.99
Male	.98 <sup>a</sup>	.78 <sup>a</sup>	.46	.45	.35	.48	.10
Other language	.03	-.33	-.41	-.39	-.19	-.21	.15
Married	.83 <sup>a</sup>	.43 <sup>c</sup>	.45	.50	.45	.52	.66
Below High School	-.37	-.76 <sup>a</sup>	-.04	-.06	-.19	-.15	-.56
Rural	.55 <sup>b</sup>	.51	.56	.60	.55	.45	.74
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>							
Social conservatism		1.12 <sup>a</sup>	.68 <sup>b</sup>	.71 <sup>a</sup>	.61 <sup>b</sup>	.51 <sup>c</sup>	.40
Free enterprise		2.97 <sup>a</sup>	2.23 <sup>a</sup>	2.21 <sup>a</sup>	2.14 <sup>a</sup>	2.14 <sup>a</sup>	.93
Racial minorities		-.70 <sup>b</sup>	-.69 <sup>b</sup>	-.65 <sup>b</sup>	-.61 <sup>c</sup>	-.62 <sup>c</sup>	-.17
Feminism		-.69 <sup>a</sup>	-.57 <sup>b</sup>	-.61 <sup>b</sup>	-.55 <sup>c</sup>	-.53 <sup>c</sup>	-.46
Religiosity		.49 <sup>a</sup>	.48 <sup>c</sup>	.48 <sup>c</sup>	.53 <sup>b</sup>	.57 <sup>b</sup>	.28
Regional alienation		.34	.20	.24	.32	.13	.34
Cynicism		.38	.39	.34	-.50	-.37	.11
<b>3. Party Identification</b>							
Liberal			-.63	-.64	-.57	-.58	-.24
Alliance			36.95	35.96	25.84 <sup>a</sup>	25.59 <sup>a</sup>	24.79 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			.77	.79	.73	.72	1.17
New Democrat			-4.43 <sup>a</sup>	-4.42 <sup>a</sup>	-4.38 <sup>a</sup>	-4.33 <sup>a</sup>	-3.60 <sup>a</sup>
<b>4. Economy</b>							
Retrospective evaluation				.16	.32	.39	.27
<b>5. Issues</b>							
Federal powers					-.35	-.20	-.06
Public health					-.26	-.43 <sup>c</sup>	-.38
Gun control					-.45 <sup>b</sup>	-.45 <sup>b</sup>	-.34
Direct democracy					.64 <sup>a</sup>	.60 <sup>b</sup>	.43
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>							
Environment						.91 <sup>a</sup>	.99 <sup>a</sup>
Health						-.61 <sup>c</sup>	-.60
Taxes						-.54 <sup>c</sup>	-.26
Corruption						-.40	.15
Early call						.15	.01
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>							
Chrétien							-1.91 <sup>a</sup>
Day							6.27 <sup>a</sup>
Clark							-.42
McDonough							-2.90 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	-.25	-1.04 <sup>a</sup>	-1.65 <sup>a</sup>	-1.6 <sup>a</sup>	1.85 <sup>a</sup>	1.51 <sup>a</sup>	1.55 <sup>b</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.22	.46	.46	.48	.50	.65
Log likelihood	-1412.54	-1189.37	-819.43	-813.90	-790.54	-745.12	-516.86
N	1280	1221	1217	1215	1202	1193	1181

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix A6. Multinomial Estimation of NDP versus PC Vote Choice Outside Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>							
Atlantic	-.30	-.25	.00	.03	.08	.19	-.35
West	.52 <sup>c</sup>	.82 <sup>b</sup>	.75 <sup>c</sup>	.75 <sup>c</sup>	.83 <sup>b</sup>	.75 <sup>c</sup>	1.03 <sup>b</sup>
Catholic	.71 <sup>b</sup>	.75 <sup>b</sup>	1.04 <sup>a</sup>	1.10 <sup>a</sup>	1.06 <sup>a</sup>	1.04 <sup>a</sup>	1.04 <sup>b</sup>
Non-religious	1.36 <sup>a</sup>	.78 <sup>b</sup>	.74	.75	.75	.75	.81
North European	.45	.68	.37	.44	.46	.50	.31
Non-European	.26	.48	.60	.80	.72	1.05	.60
Male	-.29	-.17	-.10	-.04	.05	-.12	.33
Other Language	-.07	.26	.32	.33	.14	.21	-.09
Married	-.54 <sup>b</sup>	-.39	-.38	-.43	-.43	-.47	-.23
Below High-School	1.12 <sup>c</sup>	1.29 <sup>a</sup>	.62	.59	.65	.61	.89
Rural	-.21	-.25	-.37	-.40	-.31	-.20	-.21
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>							
Moral traditionalism		-.53 <sup>b</sup>	-.30	-.38	-.36	-.29	-.47
Free enterprise		-2.91 <sup>a</sup>	-2.24 <sup>a</sup>	-2.12 <sup>a</sup>	-2.08 <sup>a</sup>	-2.23 <sup>a</sup>	-1.98 <sup>a</sup>
Racial minorities		.46	.28	.31	.24	.25	-.05
Feminism		.00	.06	.08	.02	-.01	-.14
Religiosity		-.21	-.25	-.27	-.25	-.33	-.26
Regional alienation		.15	.37	.28	.20	.44	.37
Cynicism		.44	.46	.30	.45	.42	.26
<b>3. Party Identification</b>							
Liberal			.28	.32	.32	.18	.05
Alliance			-30.48	-32.50	-33.50	-31.22	-34.27
Conservative			-2.37 <sup>a</sup>	-2.38 <sup>a</sup>	-2.37 <sup>a</sup>	-2.36 <sup>a</sup>	-1.73
New Democrat			3.60 <sup>a</sup>	3.54 <sup>a</sup>	3.44 <sup>a</sup>	3.44 <sup>a</sup>	2.63 <sup>a</sup>
<b>4. Economy</b>							
Retrospective evaluation				-.60 <sup>b</sup>	-.69 <sup>a</sup>	-.75 <sup>a</sup>	-.86 <sup>a</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>							
Federal powers					-.22	-.31	-.02
Public health					.13	.27	.31
Gun control					.43 <sup>b</sup>	.41 <sup>b</sup>	.51 <sup>b</sup>
Direct democracy					-.38	-.35	-.48
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>							
Environment						-.32	-.48
Health						.99 <sup>b</sup>	1.03 <sup>b</sup>
Taxes						.31	.35
Corruption						.25	.03
Early call						.43	.46
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>							
Chrétien							.65
Day							-.17
Clark							-4.14 <sup>a</sup>
McDonough							2.69 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	-.34	-1.10 <sup>a</sup>	-1.32 <sup>a</sup>	-1.29 <sup>a</sup>	-1.50 <sup>a</sup>	-1.12 <sup>b</sup>	-.91
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.22	.46	.46	.48	.50	.65
Log likelihood	-1412.54	-1189.37	-819.43	-813.90	-790.54	-745.12	-516.86
N	1280	1221	1217	1215	1202	1193	1181

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix B1. Multinomial Estimation of Bloc versus Liberal Vote Choice, Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French language	2.00 <sup>a</sup>	1.62 <sup>a</sup>	1.55 <sup>b</sup>	1.16 <sup>c</sup>	1.32 <sup>b</sup>	1.83 <sup>b</sup>
Age 55+	-.69 <sup>a</sup>	.22	.62	.54	.42	.99 <sup>c</sup>
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>						
Québec sovereignty		2.96 <sup>a</sup>	2.26 <sup>a</sup>	2.17 <sup>a</sup>	2.19 <sup>a</sup>	2.10 <sup>a</sup>
Social conservatism		-.58 <sup>c</sup>	-.57	-.41	-.40	-.40
Regional alienation		1.24 <sup>a</sup>	.86 <sup>b</sup>	.63	.48	.31
Cynicism		1.28 <sup>b</sup>	.84 <sup>c</sup>	.82 <sup>c</sup>	.64	.83
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-2.37 <sup>a</sup>	-2.31 <sup>a</sup>	-2.37 <sup>a</sup>	-1.96 <sup>a</sup>
Bloc Québécois			24.09 <sup>a</sup>	24.15 <sup>a</sup>	24.20 <sup>a</sup>	23.74 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			20.39 <sup>a</sup>	21.09 <sup>a</sup>	20.77 <sup>a</sup>	21.10 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			-43.01 <sup>a</sup>	-42.78 <sup>a</sup>	-42.45 <sup>a</sup>	-43.7 <sup>a</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public health				-.24	-.25	.00
Federal powers				-.97 <sup>a</sup>	-.89 <sup>a</sup>	-.46
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					-.39	-.45
Early call					1.01 <sup>b</sup>	.98
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						-2.07 <sup>a</sup>
Day						-.05
Clark						-.11
Duceppe						3.61 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	-1.40 <sup>a</sup>	-1.16 <sup>b</sup>	-1.38	-1.35 <sup>b</sup>	-1.67 <sup>b</sup>	-2.12 <sup>a</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06	.40	.55	.56	.57	.69
Log likelihood	-617.90	-386.53	-287.58	-279.69	-270.77	-194.33
n	617	604	602	600	600	596

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix B2. Multinomial Estimation of PC versus Liberal Vote Choice, Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French language	3.09 <sup>b</sup>	2.71 <sup>c</sup>	3.74 <sup>a</sup>	3.44 <sup>c</sup>	3.49 <sup>c</sup>	2.51
Age 55+	-.27	-.02	-.14	-.13	-.41	.25
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>						
Québec sovereignty		1.23 <sup>a</sup>	1.14 <sup>a</sup>	1.15 <sup>a</sup>	1.18 <sup>a</sup>	.82
Social conservatism		-.56	-.40	-.23	-.24	-.53
Regional alienation		.73	.63	.62	.49	.24
Cynicism		1.20 <sup>b</sup>	1.21 <sup>c</sup>	1.16 <sup>c</sup>	1.07	1.70 <sup>c</sup>
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-1.39 <sup>b</sup>	-1.55 <sup>b</sup>	-1.65 <sup>b</sup>	-.77
Bloc Québécois			-15.35	-10.30	-9.23	-17.24
Alliance			-21.67 <sup>a</sup>	-17.55	-16.76	-20.62 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			4.70 <sup>a</sup>	5.04 <sup>a</sup>	5.30 <sup>a</sup>	5.54 <sup>b</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public health				-.74 <sup>b</sup>	-.70 <sup>b</sup>	-.38
Federal powers				-.36	-.21	.43
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					.10	.09
Early call					2.06 <sup>a</sup>	1.40 <sup>c</sup>
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						-2.85 <sup>a</sup>
Day						-1.58 <sup>b</sup>
Clark						3.29 <sup>a</sup>
Duceppe						1.19
Constant	-4.82 <sup>a</sup>	-4.17 <sup>a</sup>	-5.01 <sup>a</sup>	-4.85 <sup>b</sup>	-5.26 <sup>a</sup>	-4.63 <sup>a</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06	.40	.55	.56	.57	.69
Log likelihood	-617.90	-386.53	-287.58	-279.69	-270.77	-194.33
n	617	604	602	600	600	596

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix B3. Multinomial Estimation of Alliance versus Liberal Vote Choice, Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French language	1.03 <sup>b</sup>	.66 <sup>c</sup>	.55	.35	.57	2.41 <sup>b</sup>
Age 55+	-1.46 <sup>a</sup>	-1.64 <sup>a</sup>	-1.59 <sup>a</sup>	-1.65 <sup>a</sup>	-1.83 <sup>a</sup>	-2.19 <sup>b</sup>
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>						
Québec sovereignty		.50	.01	-.07	-.08	.54
Social conservatism		.42	.52 <sup>c</sup>	.69 <sup>c</sup>	.71 <sup>c</sup>	.41
Regional alienation		1.34 <sup>a</sup>	1.26 <sup>a</sup>	1.11 <sup>b</sup>	.87 <sup>c</sup>	1.07
Cynicism		.94 <sup>b</sup>	.61 <sup>a</sup>	.58	.25	.44
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-1.68 <sup>a</sup>	-1.73 <sup>a</sup>	-1.74 <sup>a</sup>	-.55
Bloc Québécois			22.70 <sup>a</sup>	22.74 <sup>a</sup>	22.82 <sup>a</sup>	23.37 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			25.37 <sup>a</sup>	26.15 <sup>a</sup>	25.85 <sup>a</sup>	25.29 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			-42.56 <sup>a</sup>	-42.90 <sup>a</sup>	-41.51 <sup>a</sup>	-37.23 <sup>a</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public health				-.32	-.39	.18
Federal powers				-.67 <sup>c</sup>	-.57	-.73
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					-.81 <sup>b</sup>	-1.09 <sup>b</sup>
Early call					1.22 <sup>b</sup>	1.09
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						-2.65 <sup>a</sup>
Day						6.49 <sup>a</sup>
Clark						.32
Duceppe						-1.62 <sup>c</sup>
Constant	-2.13 <sup>a</sup>	-1.91 <sup>a</sup>	-1.97 <sup>a</sup>	-1.96 <sup>a</sup>	-2.47 <sup>a</sup>	-5.03 <sup>a</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06	.40	.55	.56	.57	.69
Log likelihood	-617.90	-386.53	-287.58	-279.69	-270.77	-194.33
n	617	604	602	600	600	596

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix B4. Multinomial Estimation of Bloc versus PC Vote Choice, Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French language	-1.09	-1.09	-2.19	-2.28	-2.16	-.68
Age 55+	-.42	.24	.75	.67	.83	.74
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>						
Québec sovereignty		1.73 <sup>a</sup>	1.13 <sup>a</sup>	1.03 <sup>a</sup>	1.02 <sup>b</sup>	1.28 <sup>a</sup>
Social conservatism		-.02	-.17	-.18	-.16	.13
Regional alienation		.51	.23	.01	-.02	.07
Cynicism		.08	-.37	-.34	-.43	-.88
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-.98	-.77	-.72	-1.19
Bloc Québécois			25.44 <sup>a</sup>	25.46 <sup>a</sup>	25.43 <sup>a</sup>	24.98 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			21.06 <sup>a</sup>	21.64 <sup>a</sup>	21.53 <sup>a</sup>	20.72 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			-47.72 <sup>a</sup>	-47.82 <sup>a</sup>	-47.75 <sup>a</sup>	-49.26 <sup>a</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public health				.50	.45	.38
Federal powers				-.62	-.68	-.89 <sup>c</sup>
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					-.49	-.53
Early call					-1.04	-.42
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						.78
Day						1.53 <sup>b</sup>
Clark						-3.40 <sup>a</sup>
Duceppe						2.42 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	-3.43 <sup>b</sup>	-3.01 <sup>b</sup>	-3.63 <sup>c</sup>	3.50 <sup>c</sup>	3.59 <sup>c</sup>	2.51
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06	.40	.55	.56	.57	.69
Log likelihood	-617.90	-386.53	-287.58	-279.69	-270.77	-194.33
n	617	604	602	600	600	596

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix B5. Multinomial Estimation of Bloc versus Alliance Vote Choice, Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French language	.97 <sup>c</sup>	.96	1.00	.81	.76	-.58
Age 55+	.77 <sup>c</sup>	1.86 <sup>a</sup>	2.20 <sup>a</sup>	2.19 <sup>a</sup>	2.25 <sup>a</sup>	3.18 <sup>a</sup>
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>						
Québec sovereignty		2.46 <sup>a</sup>	2.26 <sup>a</sup>	2.24 <sup>a</sup>	2.28 <sup>a</sup>	1.55 <sup>a</sup>
Social conservatism		-.99 <sup>a</sup>	-1.08 <sup>a</sup>	-1.10 <sup>b</sup>	-1.11 <sup>a</sup>	-.81
Regional alienation		-.10	-.40	-.48	-.40	-.76
Cynicism		.34	.23	.24	.38	.39
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-.69	-.58	-.63	-1.41
Bloc Québécois			1.39 <sup>b</sup>	1.42 <sup>b</sup>	1.38 <sup>b</sup>	.37
Alliance			-4.98 <sup>a</sup>	-5.07 <sup>a</sup>	-5.08 <sup>a</sup>	-4.19 <sup>b</sup>
Conservative			-21.45 <sup>a</sup>	-20.88 <sup>a</sup>	-20.94 <sup>a</sup>	-25.49 <sup>a</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public health				.07	.14	-.18
Federal powers				-.30	-.32	.27
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					.41	.64
Early call					-.21	-.11
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						.58
Day						-6.55 <sup>a</sup>
Clark						-.43
Duceppe						5.23 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	.74	.75	.58	.61	.80	2.91 <sup>b</sup>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06	.40	.55	.56	.57	.69
Log likelihood	-617.90	-386.53	-287.58	-279.69	-270.77	-194.33
n	617	604	602	600	600	596

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$

**Appendix B6. Multinomial Estimation of Alliance versus PC Vote Choice, Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French language	-2.06	-2.05	-3.19	-3.09	-2.92	-.09
Age 55+	-1.18 <sup>b</sup>	-1.62 <sup>b</sup>	-1.45 <sup>c</sup>	-1.51 <sup>c</sup>	-1.42 <sup>c</sup>	-2.44 <sup>b</sup>
<b>2. Values and Beliefs</b>						
Québec sovereignty		-.73 <sup>c</sup>	-1.12 <sup>b</sup>	-1.22 <sup>b</sup>	-1.26 <sup>b</sup>	-.28
Social conservatism		.97 <sup>b</sup>	.92 <sup>c</sup>	.92	.95	.94
Regional alienation		.62	.63	.49	.38	.83
Cynicism		-.26	-.60	-.58	-.81	-1.27
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-.29	-.19	-.09	.22
Bloc Québécois			24.05 <sup>a</sup>	24.04 <sup>a</sup>	24.05 <sup>a</sup>	24.61 <sup>a</sup>
Alliance			26.04 <sup>a</sup>	26.71 <sup>a</sup>	26.61 <sup>a</sup>	24.91 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative			-47.26 <sup>a</sup>	-47.94 <sup>a</sup>	-46.81 <sup>a</sup>	-42.77 <sup>a</sup>
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public health				.43	.31	.56
Federal powers				-.31	-.36	-1.16 <sup>c</sup>
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					-.91 <sup>c</sup>	-1.18 <sup>c</sup>
Early call					-.83	-.31
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						.21
Day						8.07 <sup>a</sup>
Clark						-2.97 <sup>a</sup>
Duceppe						-2.81 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	2.69 <sup>c</sup>	2.26	3.04	2.89	2.79	-.40
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06	.40	.55	.56	.57	.69
Log likelihood	-617.90	-386.53	-287.58	-279.69	-270.77	-194.33
n	617	604	602	600	600	596

a: significant  $\alpha \leq .01$  ; b: significant  $\alpha \leq .05$  ; c: significant  $\alpha \leq .10$









**Appendix D1: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Bloc  
in Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French Language	35.6	12.0	9.1	6.3	7.0	6.5
Age 55-	-11.1	5.0	8.2	7.5	7.2	8.8
<b>2. Beliefs and Values</b>						
Québec sovereignty		34.3	26.5	25.1	24.8	17.9
Social Conservatism		-6.5	-6.2	-5.5	-5.5	-3.0
Regional alienation		8.9	3.7	1.9	1.3	0.1
Cynicism		9.1	3.7	3.6	2.8	1.8
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-15.3	-14.0	-14.1	-12.0
Bloc Québécois			41.3	41.8	41.9	37.7
Alliance			-30.8	-30.9	-30.4	-4.3
Conservative			-46.7	-46.2	-46.3	-46.1
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public Health				-0.3	-0.3	0.4
Federal powers				-6.4	-6.1	-3.8
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					-2.4	-2.3
Early call					1.3	2.6
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						-9.0
Day						-33.5
Clark						-12.7
Duceppe						30.3

**Appendix D2: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Liberals in Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French Language	-41.8	-17.1	-14.0	-10.6	-11.8	-14.7
Age 55-	16.5	3.8	.8	1.4	2.6	-1.9
<b>2. Beliefs and Values</b>						
Québec sovereignty		-23.1	-19.1	-18.4	-18.2	-13.3
Social Conservatism		2.2	1.1	-0.8	-0.8	1.7
Regional alienation		-16.1	-10.4	-8.3	-6.0	-3.4
Cynicism		-14.8	-8.8	-8.2	-5.8	-7.3
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			21.5	20.9	20.6	10.0
Bloc Québécois			-42.9	-43.4	-43.6	-42.6
Alliance			-40.1	-40.6	-40.7	-40.6
Conservative			-24.0	-25.1	-25.4	-23.7
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public Health				3.3	3.4	0.2
Federal powers				7.5	6.2	1.6
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					3.4	2.9
Early call					-12.7	-8.0
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						17.3
Day						-29.5
Clark						-13.6
Duceppe						-19.7

**Appendix D3: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the PC  
in Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French Language	5.0	4.8	5.7	5.5	5.3	4.2
Age 55-	.9	.1	-1.1	-1.0	-1.6	-0.6
<b>2. Beliefs and Values</b>						
Québec sovereignty		-4.5	-2.1	-1.5	-1.5	-2.2
Social Conservatism		-1.5	-1.0	-0.7	-0.8	-1.2
Regional alienation		-.1	.3	0.9	0.7	0.0
Cynicism		2.6	3.9	3.6	3.6	5.9
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-1.6	-2.2	-2.2	0.6
Bloc Québécois			-7.1	-7.2	-7.2	-7.6
Alliance			-5.4	-5.5	-5.4	-6.1
Conservative			53.9	54.4	54.6	51.8
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public Health				-2.0	-1.8	-1.3
Federal powers				0.5	1.2	3.9
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					1.8	1.7
Early call					7.6	3.6
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						-4.0
Day						-3.7
Clark						27.5
Duceppe						-3.2

**Appendix D4: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Alliance  
in Quebec**

	1	1-2	1-3	1-5	1-6	1-7
<b>1. Socio-economic Characteristics</b>						
French Language	1.3	0.4	-0.8	-1.3	-0.5	4.0
Age 55-	-6.3	-8.9	-7.9	-7.9	-8.2	-6.4
<b>2. Beliefs and Values</b>						
Québec sovereignty		-6.7	-5.3	-5.2	-5.1	-2.5
Social Conservatism		5.8	6.1	7.1	7.0	2.6
Regional alienation		7.2	6.3	5.6	4.1	3.3
Cynicism		3.0	1.2	1.0	-0.6	-0.3
<b>3. Party Identification</b>						
Liberal			-4.6	-4.7	-4.3	1.5
Bloc Québécois			8.7	8.8	8.9	12.6
Alliance			76.3	76.9	76.6	50.9
Conservative			16.9	16.9	17.0	18.0
<b>5. Issues</b>						
Public Health				-1.0	-1.3	0.7
Federal powers				-1.7	-1.3	-1.6
<b>6. Liberal Performance</b>						
Taxes					-2.8	-2.3
Early call					3.8	1.8
<b>7. Leader Evaluation</b>						
Chrétien						-4.3
Day						66.8
Clark						-1.3
Duceppe						-7.4

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> In both cases, socio-demographic characteristics and party identification figure among the most distant factors and leader evaluations among the most proximate ones, but there are some slight differences. We see values and beliefs as prior to party identification and economic evaluations as prior to issue opinions. Changing these assumptions would not greatly affect the conclusions.

<sup>2</sup> Additional information may be obtained from the Canadian Election Study website at: <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces-eeec>

<sup>3</sup> For an analysis of the sources of that bias see Durand, Blais, and Vachon (2001).

<sup>4</sup> The NDP received less than 2 percent of the vote in Quebec.

<sup>5</sup> When a coefficient is significant at the .05 level, the implication is that the chances are at least 95 percent that the relationship observed in our sample holds for the whole population.

<sup>6</sup> There are proportionally more Catholics in Ontario and the percentage of Canadians of non-European origin is the same in the West and Ontario.

<sup>7</sup> According to the multinomial logit regressions reported in column 1 of Appendix A, the average probability of a Liberal vote outside Quebec was 42 percent. If we set the Catholic coefficient to 0 (and thus assume that being Catholics had no effect on the vote), the average probability of a Liberal vote would drop to 38 percent. In other words, the Liberal vote would have fallen by four percentage points if not for the support of Catholics. Unless otherwise indicated, all the simulations reported in this paper use the same logic. We determine whether the average overall probability of a vote for a given party changes when a specific variable is assumed to have no effect, keeping all other factors constant.

<sup>8</sup> There are also signs of a gender gap in Quebec. Women were more prone to vote Liberal while men were more inclined to support the Bloc, but this gap does not quite reach statistical significance.

<sup>9</sup> Because the mailback has a lower response rate, the number of cases drops from 1221 to 755.

<sup>10</sup> One Canadian in two is basically ambivalent about the free enterprise system, 27 percent are basically favourable, and 22 percent are basically opposed. Scores between -.25 and +.25 on a -1 to +1 scale were considered to indicate ambivalence. Appendix E provides a description of the various scales used in this paper.

<sup>11</sup> When respondents were asked how much they thought should be done for racial minorities, 41 percent said “more”, 40 percent “about the same as now”, and 13 percent “less”. Sixty-two percent of our sample indicated they were very or quite sympathetic to feminism, with most of them opting for quite sympathetic.

<sup>12</sup> Opposition to sovereignty was more intense than support for it. As many as 39 percent were very opposed, but only 17 percent were very favourable.

<sup>13</sup> For instance, the estimated mean probability of voting NDP (outside Quebec) when people are assumed to identify with the party (keeping all their social background characteristics and values and beliefs constant) is 49 percent; when they are assumed to have no party identification the same probability is only 8 percent. The difference (41 percentage points) reflects the independent impact of NDP identification on the propensity to vote NDP.

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<sup>14</sup> For instance, the estimated mean probability of voting Liberal (outside Quebec) in our sample is 42 percent. The same estimated probability when the coefficients of the four party identification coefficients are set to 0 (keeping everything else constant) is 39 percent. The implication is that if party identification had had no independent effect on the vote, the Liberal vote share would have been reduced by three points, and so the Liberal net gain resulting from their dominance among loyal partisans is three percentage points..

<sup>15</sup> Note, however, that the drop in the unemployment rate occurred in the early part of the Liberal mandate; the unemployment rate was already at 6.8 percent in January 2000, so that there was no improvement in 2000. Likewise, real disposable income increased by only 0.6 percent in 2000.

<sup>16</sup> There is a weak bivariate correlation before controls are introduced.

<sup>17</sup> Twenty-one percent favored both tax cuts and increased social spending, while 27 percent wanted neither.

<sup>18</sup> A random half of the sample were asked about a \$10 fee and the other half about a \$20 fee.

<sup>19</sup> A random half were asked about the federal government and the other half about the provincial governments. The two questions are pooled here, “more” for one level being interpreted as “less” for the other and vice-versa.

<sup>20</sup> A random half was asked about important issues and the other half about controversial issues.

<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately the question in Quebec mistakenly referred to patronage rather than corruption. Comparisons between Quebec and the other regions should take that difference into account.

<sup>22</sup> There is one small exception: those who were particularly dissatisfied with Liberal performance on taxation were slightly more inclined to support the Alliance.

<sup>23</sup> The reference group is those with no opinion.

<sup>24</sup> They were particularly successful among those who were satisfied and who were opposed to privatization.

<sup>25</sup> Note that these numbers refer to those (the great majority) who said that the quality of health care had gotten worse over the years.

<sup>26</sup> Thirty-seven percent attributed the problem to poor management and 31 percent thought it was both factors (or did not know).

<sup>27</sup> Seventy-two percent of our respondents said fighting crime was a very important issue. This was second to improving health care (84 percent), and ahead of creating jobs (68 percent) and cutting taxes (54 percent).

<sup>28</sup> The exact question was: “Are you very angry that the federal election was called early, somewhat angry, or not angry at all?”.

<sup>29</sup> The 1997 numbers are corrected because in that election respondents who said they knew nothing about a leader were not asked in the campaign survey to provide their evaluation of that leader. See Blais et al. 2000. The correction has been performed by imputing lower scores to those who were not asked to rate the leader because they knew nothing about him/her. The uncorrected mean scores (outside Quebec) in 1997 were: 56 for Chrétien and Charest, 46 for McDonough, and 44 for Manning. The corrected scores were: 54 for Chrétien, 52 for Charest, 41 for McDonough, and 38 for Manning.

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<sup>30</sup> The uncorrected mean ratings in Quebec were: 57 for Charest, 45 for Chrétien, and 42 for Duceppe. The corrected scores were: 54 for Charest, 43 for Chrétien, and 38 for Duceppe.

<sup>31</sup> We do not present data on the evolution of Duceppe's ratings during the campaign because the number of interviews in Quebec does not allow such comparisons. Our data suggest that his ratings were slightly higher at the end of the campaign than at the beginning.

<sup>32</sup> The figure for Clark and Duceppe was 43 percent and 47 percent for McDonough.

<sup>33</sup> More precisely, the regressions allow us to estimate each respondent's probability of voting for each of the parties. The respondent is predicted to vote for the party with the highest probability.

<sup>34</sup> This entails setting the leader evaluation coefficients at 0 and keeping all the other coefficients intact.

<sup>35</sup> In Quebec, Clark appears to have benefited from perceptions of trustworthiness but not to have suffered from an image of weakness.

<sup>36</sup> Likewise, mean ratings of Day remained the same both among those who believe that the bible is the word of God (55) and among those who disagree (39) in the first and second halves of the campaign.

<sup>37</sup> We use standardized scores: each party's score is divided by the total scores given to the four (five in Quebec) parties, and multiplied by 100.

<sup>38</sup> Perceptions of the race moved somewhat during the campaign. The greatest change concerned the Alliance. Its average chances were perceived to be 27 percent at the beginning of the campaign and 21 percent at the end.

<sup>39</sup> Through a multinomial logit estimation, voters' perceptions of the various parties' chances of winning were related to the actual vote obtained by a party in 1997 in the respondent's constituency on the one hand and to party identification (whether the respondent identifies or not with that party) on the other hand. The setup also included all the social background characteristics that have been shown to affect vote choice.

<sup>40</sup> We arrived at that estimate on the basis of the methodology described in Blais et al. (2001b). On the basis of a multinomial logit estimation which includes all the preference variables shown in Table and NO CHANCE-ALLIANCE (the only NO CHANCE variable that is statistically significant), we determined which party each respondent is predicted to vote for, based first on both preferences and perceptions of the race and, second, on preferences alone (that is, assuming that perceptions of the race have no effect on the vote). When the two predictions diverge, the implication is that perceptions of the race were decisive in vote choice. This was the case for only 1 percent of our respondents.

<sup>41</sup> After asking our respondents which party they voted for, we inquired whether this was the party they liked the most and, when appropriate, which party they did like the most. For those who indicated that they voted for a party other than the one they liked the most, we took the party they liked the most as their second choice.

<sup>42</sup> Forty percent of Bloc voters did not have a second choice, and the rest were dispersed among the other parties

<sup>43</sup> Indeed, among those with an opinion, 59 percent thought that there was hardly any difference between the Alliance and Reform.